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Foreword
European democracies face multiple challenges.  Trust towards political parties and 
governing elites has been in decline for some time. In the aftermath of the financial and 
social crisis, the recent flows of migration and heightened security concerns politics have 
taken a turn towards polarisation and populism. The rise of «anti-establishment» parties 
and discourses and the appeal of political strongmen are indicative of a sense of malaise 
that seems to traverse liberal democracies. 
At the same time, competing in the global economy, responding to international security 
threats, and reducing inequalities without breaking the economic and political ties that bind 
nations together, all require strong, performing but also politically legitimate institutions 
and coordinated action. There is a widespread perception that democracy is in need of 
reshaping with an emphasis on participation, engagement, transparency, responsiveness, 
accountability and effectiveness. 
Now more than ever rich interdisciplinary research is necessary for building inclusive, open, 
fairer and altogether mode democratic societies.  
Increasing democratic legitimacy in the EU through stronger citizen participation is a 
priority of the European Commission. The EU’s Framework Programmes for Research and 
Innovation have devoted significant investments towards the study of democracy, political 
representation, rights and participation etc. As a result an impressive accumulation of 
knowledge about the past, present and future of democracy has occurred under FP7 and 
H2020 SC6 projects. 
The present Policy Review takes stock of the results, findings and recommendations, and 
assesses the needs, gaps and pertinent foci for future European research on democracy. 
These should enrich future steps in the design and implementation of Horizon Europe. 
Finding ways of bolstering and improving our democratic institutions is a matter of 
paramount significance. 
                                                                                         Jean-Eric Paquet
Director General DG RTD
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Executive Summary
Democracies are under pressure. Although the established democracies exhibit a 
distinctively higher quality today than in their alleged golden years of the 1960s and the 
70s, they seem more fragile and more vulnerable than in the past. This new paradox of 
developed but fragile democracies is increasingly sustained by the populist construction of 
a conflict between the democratic principles of popular sovereignty on the one hand and the 
constitutional-liberal sphere of civil rights and the rule of law on the other. 
In the last 50 years, the democratization of democracy has primarily led to an expansion of 
the constitutional-liberal dimension. Those parts of the population in Western democracies 
who consider this liberalization to have gone too far or who feel neglected by the established 
organizations and institutions are now successfully mobilized by right-wing populists 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Right-wing populist parties are in the process of filling the 
representative gap that established parties have left open during the last three decades in 
Western and Eastern Europe.
In order to systematically examine the fragility and deficits of today’s established 
democracies, one can look at three levels of the democratic system: the micro level, the 
meso level, and the macro level.
On the micro level of political attitudes, behaviour, voting, and participation, we can observe 
specific trends that are problematic for the stability on the meso level of political parties 
as well as the macro level of the core institutions of representative democracy. Electoral 
volatility is leading increasingly to insecurity among political parties and has, in some cases, 
triggered landslide shifts in the party system as in Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, or France. 
The long trend of declining voter turnout has made most democracies suffer from declining 
electoral legitimacy in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the moderate electoral decline 
appears to have stopped due to a new polarization of electoral competition between 
populists and anti-populists. Although polarization has re-mobilized recently alienated 
voters, it has not changed the significant social selectivity of elections and other forms of 
political participation. The lower third of European societies rarely participates in political 
affairs. Our democracies have become “two-third democracies”. 
The shifting involvement of citizens has led to shifting structures in many party systems 
in the East and West. The two most important shifts are closely connected: The decline of 
catch-all parties and the rise of Right-Wing Populist parties (RWPs). The decline of catch-all 
parties (CAPs) as the dominant parties in post-war Europe seems to be irreversible. There 
are only a few classical CAPs left. The CAPs’ decline is particularly problematic in times 
of heterogenization and polarization where these parties’ traditional function of political 
socialization and integration is badly needed. The parties that benefit most from CAPs’ 
decline are indeed RWPs, which split and polarize liberal societies instead of integrating 
them. Their illiberal ethnocentrism enjoys growing popularity and most of them can be 
considered as posing a major attack on the liberal dimension of democracy.
There are structural signs that the “populist split” will deepen and, therefore, the RWPs will 
continue to be relevant actors in liberal-democratic polities in Eastern and Western Europe. 
There is a new cleavage between cosmopolitans (open borders) and communitarians 
(closed borders) in our societies. The democratic version of communitarianism, based on 
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the social democratic idea of a solidaristic and egalitarian society, is in decline, whereas the 
nationalistic communitarianism represented by RWPs is on the rise. 
European party systems have become more volatile, polarized, and fragmented. This will 
make it more difficult to form stable coalition governments that are ideologically close 
enough to produce solid policy responses to the social, economic, and environmental 
challenges of our time. Democracy on the systemic macro level will have to deal with this 
new insecurity.
On all three levels, the new forms of deregulated and globalized markets pose a major 
challenge to one of the core democratic principles, namely that of (political) equality. At 
the same time, the power of global firms and the simultaneous erosion of trade unions 
and labour-based parties have created an imbalance between capital and labour that 
is reinforced by the diminished role national government can play in dealing with global 
players such as Google or Facebook. It is not that democracy has to be made compatible 
with global markets, but global markets with democracy.
If the core representative institutions that are parties, parliaments, and governments lose 
trust and acceptance among the citizens, will so-called democratic innovations strengthen 
participation and direct democracy? Here, the balance sheet is mixed. Referenda, the oldest 
form of direct democracy within representative settings, nurture the citizens’ belief in 
democracy in general and the political community in particular. However, they may also 
produce illiberal results and may nurture anti-EU sentiments. More innovative forms such 
as deliberative polling, deliberative mini-publics, participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies, 
e-town hall meetings, or other forms of digital democracy are relevant for strengthening 
participation. But all these innovations have two sides. On the one hand, they bring creative 
new initiatives into democratic politics, but on the other hand, they demand high cognitive 
and time resources that the better-educated middle and upper classes can more easily 
draw on than the aforementioned lower third of society. All democratic innovations have 
to be assessed on whether they aggravate or not the social divide in political participation. 
Here, we need more empirical research by non-partisan researchers. It also has to be 
considered that these direct forms of democracy should be compatible with the main norms 
and procedures of representative democracies. They should complement them, but not 
substitute or delegitimize them.
Democratic legitimacy seems to have lost its balance and compass. There has been or 
threatens to be a shift from technocratic governance, multilaterlism, supranantionalism, 
and consensual policymaking towards majoritarianism, unilateralism, nationalism, and 
polarization. Political elites have to react with reforms to defend liberal democracy against 
the illiberal populist and nationalist attacks. We need deeper insights into the reasons for 
these shifts on the micro, meso, and macro levels. Such highly relevant political research that 
can support political action in favour of democracy, its stability, and its further development. 
Simple muddling through or the desire to return to the status quo ante will not do.
The aim of this Review is twofold. On the hand it identifies those fields of democracy 
research and its findings where we already do know very much. Here we have to ask: What 
can we do in order to build further on that research? At the same time (and importantly) 
the Review focuses on research areas where we have considerable gaps in our knowledge 
about the workings of and present threats to democracy. What can we do in order to fill 
those gaps? The guiding idea is to systematically achieve a state of knowledge about the 
7Policy Review
present and future of democracy as a system, as a “Gestalt”. It is our firm conviction that 
forthcoming research on democracy can only be fully legitimated if itis both, scientifically 
and politically relevant. Without such knowledge political and social science cannot inform 
and support policymakers and representatives about possible and necessary reforms, their 
instruments, impacts, and potential consequences.
8 Past, Present and Future of Democracy
Introduction 
Democracy is facing turbulent times. Many observers in the public domain and the media are 
seeing a crisis: The surge of right-wing populism in Eastern and Western Europe, a populist 
governing erratically the United States of America, political elites despised or even hated 
by growing numbers of citizens, declining levels of trust (Ruelens and Nicaise 2017). to 
core democratic institutions and very low participation levels for the lower socio-economic 
third of society all point to significant challenges (inter alia Crouch 2004; Della Porta 2013; 
Streeck 2014; Tormey 2015; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018). Nonetheless, even 
if the general claim is “democracy is in crisis”, it cannot be easily supported by empirical 
research (Merkel 2014b). There are indeed signs of a two-third democracy, broken 
promises, and unresolved challenges (Merkel and Kneip 2018, 1ff., 349ff.). However, the 
talk about an overall crisis of democracy is as old as democracy itself. The crisis discourse 
gained momentum in the early 1970s. Both Left and Right conducted the debate with 
vehemence and to some extent with similar structural arguments (see Offe 1984). Claus 
Offe’s Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates (1972), James O’Connor’s neo-
Marxist theory of the Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973), and Jürgen Habermas’ influential 
Legitimation Crisis (1975) heavily influenced the crisis discourse on democracy for years to 
come. The more conservative thinkers did not counter: they backed this analysis. The Report 
to the Trilateral Commission by Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) also painted a 
gloomy picture of an overburdened democracy. Nevertheless, no established democracy 
has collapsed since then.
At the optimistic end of the twentieth century, the crisis debate lost its persuasive power, 
but gained new momentum and a global response immediately after the turn of the 
millennium in Chantal Mouffe’s neo-Schmittian version of a de-politicized consensus 
democracy, in the post-democracy debate (Crouch 2004; Rancière 2006; Wolin 2008), in 
neo-democratic postulates (von Beyme 2013), and in post-structuralist (Agamben et al. 
2011) or post-Marxist (Žižek 2011) critique. The overwhelming dominance of government 
and the economy over an eroding popular sovereignty (Agamben et al. 2011, 4) or the 
threat to national democratic sovereignty from progressive globalization (Held 1995) is 
addressed. Majoritarian, genuinely participatory organizations and institutions such as 
parties and parliaments are said to have lost legitimacy in comparison to governments, 
courts, expert commissions, and international regimes (Zürn 2011, 618ff.). And the broad 
discussion among proponents of a strong (Barber 1984), participatory (Warren 2001; 
2009), or deliberative democracy (Fishkin 1991; Elster 1998; Dryzek 2000; Goodin 2008) 
has explicitly or implicitly assumed that current representative democracy is undergoing a 
crisis of participation (Saward 2010; Alonso et al. 2011). Critics often argue that without 
deliberative democratic innovations representative democracy is doomed to die. The 
message from left to right, from post-Marxists to neoconservatives in political theory is 
clear: democracy as such is in crisis, and particularly its representative institutions. 
This report refutes the more simplifying arguments of the post-democracy and post-politics 
hypothesis. In particular, it rejects the empirically unsubstantiated thesis that there was 
a golden age of democracy sometime in the past, possibly in the nineteen fifties, sixties, 
and early seventies (Crouch 2004). In the fifties and sixties of the past century women and 
wives were (even) legally disadvantaged at the labour market or in civil legal contracting, 
Afro-Americans were excluded from voting in six Southern States in the US (till 1965), in 
Switzerland women were banned from voting on the federal level until 1970, homosexuals 
were persecuted and imprisoned by criminal law in most of the European countries, and 
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the internal structures of political parties and trade unions were highly non-transparent, 
unaccountable and authoritarian. In those presumed Trente Glorieuses the liberal dimension 
and the democratic principle of legal and political equality between gender, races, ethnicities, 
as well hetero- and homosexuals were highly underdeveloped when compared to today’s 
standards in most established democracies. It is especially after those glorious post-war 
decades that an intensive liberal democratization of democracy took place in Europe and 
the West. More individual rights, more gender equality, less discrimination of homosexuals, 
migrants, foreigners, and other minorities. Nevertheless, there were at least two spheres 
which were more under democratic control than fifty years later. The national economy and 
the protection of nation-state democracy from supranational interference1. Both represent 
ongoing unresolved challenges for Western democracies at present.
Empirical democracy research has always been more cautious in its statements. It also 
concedes that democracy faces partial challenges and problems. Russell J. Dalton (2008), 
for instance, notes declining confidence in political authorities and dissatisfaction with the 
workings of democracy among democrats, and Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam posit a 
deterioration in the capabilities of democratic institutions to stimulate political participation 
(Pharr and Putnam 2000, 25ff.). However, they do not see a crisis of democracy as a 
whole. Pippa Norris (1999; 2011) denies even a crisis of trust in democracy and speaks 
of “trendless fluctuations in system support” (Norris 2011, 241). The discontent itself 
is more an indicator that citizens have become more critical than a sign of a crisis of 
democracy. And if a—relatively harmless—democratic deficit is admitted, it is attributed 
to a combination of growing expectations among increasingly critical citizens, the influence 
of negative reporting in the media and the shortcomings in the performance of democratic 
governments to which precisely the media have drawn an asymmetrical attention to. In 
most recent times, i.e., the last five years it is above all the electoral success of mostly 
right-wing populism which challenges the liberal dimension of representative democracy 
(e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; 2017; Müller 2016; Merkel and Scholl 2018; 
Spittler 2018).
Is the crisis of democracy then an invention of theoreticians, reasoned but aloof from 
empirical evidence in pursuit of an exaggerated normative democratic ideal? Or has 
empirical analysis focused too strongly on a partial diagnosis, failing to delve beneath the 
surface of survey data and electoral analysis, failing to recognize deeper crisis phenomena 
produced by the cumulative interdependence between single such phenomena?
The question of a crisis of democracy can be answered neither by general theories alone 
nor solely by empirical investigations indifferent to theory. The two strands have to mesh. 
Moreover, we argue that we have to disaggregate the two grand concepts of democracy 
and crisis in order to gain deeper and more specific insights into particular challenges of and 
threats to democracy. In addition, we have to look to the political answers by institutions, 
organizations and actors to those challenges. Where have they been successful in dealing 
with populists, socio-economic inequality, migration or the loss of power of the legislative 
branch within the constitutional order or where, when, how, and why did they fail? European 
research shows that it is above all comparative research on democracy which enriches 
our knowledge about the functioning or fails of democracy (inter alia CATCH-EyoU; CIT-
PART; EUROPOLIS; PIDOP; for the whole list of projects please see: Annex). This does not 
1 This includes the relation between the EU and its member states. We do believe that the future cannot be 
competition between nation states. But we also have to acknowledge the problems for democracy. Only if we 
acknowledge both facts can we look for profound and sustainable solutions.
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mean that we should disregard case2 studies. But they have to be understood within their 
specific historical, economic, cultural, and political contexts. Sweden is not Greece, not even 
Denmark, Germany is not France, the Netherlands are not Portugal. Their democracies 
display different features, strengths, weaknesses, and qualities (see democracybarometer.
org). Small n and large n comparisons however, help us understand more about the causes 
behind the different developments of present day democracies. Without that knowledge 
successful reforms of democracy and its policies are more based on intuition, opportunism, 
or pure power seeking than on sound reasoning and empirical facts.
2 Those cases can be countries, parties, or voters.
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1� Embedded Democracy: An Analytical Concept 
of Democracy
If we want to understand the vulnerabilities of democracy, if we want to understand to 
which form and substance well-established democracies are trending, we need an analytical 
model of democracy that goes beyond normative democratic theories and sweeping 
claims such as that the best days of democracy are over and we are already living in post-
democratic times (see e.g., Crouch 2004). If we acknowledge that democracies can die 
(Keane 2009) and want to know “How Democracies Die” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018)3 and 
how they “can be saved” (Della Porta 2011; Mounk 2018), we need an analytical concept 
that is normatively anchored in the sovereignty of the people and the liberal rule of law 
and that understands democracy as a “system” constituted by interdependent parts, which 
we call “partial regimes”. Such a concept, called “embedded democracy” (Merkel 2004), has 
already been developed and is widely accepted within the community of political scientists 
and democratic scholars.
The concept of “embedded democracy” posits that stable rule-of-law democracies are 
doubly embedded: internally, in that the partial regimes of democracy secure their existence 
through functional interlocking; externally in that each partial regime is embedded through 
rings of conditions enabling democracy and is thus protected against both external and 
internal shocks and destabilization. If external embedding is damaged or underdeveloped, 
this, too can pose challenges within democracy. The notion of embedding pursues a systemic 
logic, namely the interdependence of the component parts. Critical changes in one partial 
regime can infect other partial regimes. To what extent this occurs depends above all on 
the intensity of the partial crisis and on the functional propinquity and resilience of each 
partial regime.
Figure 1: The concept of “embedded democracy”
Source: Merkel (2010, 31, modified).
3 The full title of the most recent book of Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) suggests what we can learn from the 
past: “How Democracies Die. What history reveals about our future”.
Globalisation
Europeanisation
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The partial regimes of embedded democracy
Five regimes constitute embedded (rule-of-law) democracy: the democratic electoral regime 
(A); the regime of political participation rights (B); the partial regime of civil liberties (C); the 
institutional safeguarding of mutual constraints and horizontal accountability (D); and the 
guarantee that the effective power to govern (E) of democratically elected representatives 
is ensured de jure and de facto.
A. Electoral regime. In representative democracy, the electoral regime occupies a key 
position because elections are the most visible expression of popular sovereignty. Those 
represented elect their representatives for a fixed period. Because of the open, pluralist 
competition for key governing positions, the electoral regime also constitutes the cardinal 
difference from dictatorship. This regime is concerned with participation and representation. 
Apart from the electorate, the most important actors in the regime are political parties, and 
to a lesser extent individual politicians standing for the highest government offices. What 
is at issue is therefore interaction between voters, parties, political elites, and parliaments.
Crisis phenomena. If a crisis infects the democratic electoral system, it strikes at the heart 
of democracy. If rights are curbed and/or the representative function of elections adversely 
affected, the crisis of democracy is already well advanced. But changes in voting behaviour, 
such as growing abstention, increasing volatility, or persistent de facto discrimination 
against women, certain ethnic groups or classes are critical early warning signs that 
participation and representation do not (or no longer) sufficiently cover the entire demos. In 
critical situations in established democracies, we often find serious de facto deterioration of 
the democratic functions of free elections, provoked by declining voter turnout and factual 
social selectivity with regard to certain groups and classes.
B. Political participation. The political rights of participation, which are the precondition 
for elections and go beyond them, complete the vertical dimension of democracy. Political 
rights of participation constitute the public arena as an autonomous sphere for political 
action in which organizational and communicative power unfolds. In this sphere, collective 
processes of organization, opinion, and will-formation determine and underpin competition 
for political positions of authority. The most important organized actors in this partial 
regime of established democracies are again political parties. But the domain reaches 
beyond parties to include social (protest) movements, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), interest groups, direct-democratic forms of participation such as referendums, 
(deliberative) civic forums, institutional access to the planning of major infrastructure 
projects, and participatory budgeting. A pluralistic media system without a tendency to 
biased concentration is the best guarantee for the development of the free exchange of 
opinion.
Crisis phenomena. Changes in parties and in the party system can indicate critical tendencies 
in the political system. If catch-all parties lose votes, if anti-system and right-wing populist 
parties gain in strength, if the numerical and ideological configuration of the party system 
makes a stable government coalition almost impossible, and if parties lose the confidence of 
the electorate and their own members, mutating into cartels no longer embedded in society, 
then fundamental organizational pillars of representative democracy begin to totter. Where 
the lobby system is biased, for instance towards financially and organizationally strong 
interests, giving them privileged access to governmental decision makers, this can also 
erode the democratic principle of equality.
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C. Civil liberties. Democratic elections and political participation need to be complemented 
by civil liberties and individual basic rights. As negative rights against the state, civil liberties 
limit the claim of the state to exercise power over individuals, thus enlarging the sphere for 
their free self-determination. Individual civil rights give legal protection to life, liberty, and 
property; they protect against unjustified detention, torture, surveillance, dataveillance, or 
unlawful intervention in private life. They curb the urge of the state to expand and control. 
Functionally, civil liberties and rights to political participation cannot be kept separate. They 
are equi-primordial (Habermas) both normatively and functionally. If the one is weakened, 
this reduces the efficient functioning of the other; if is it strengthened, it vitalizes the 
effectiveness of the other. Courts and civil-society associations addressing human and civil 
rights are the most important institutional and collective actors in this partial regime.
Crisis phenomena. If the civil rights of ethnic and religious groups, immigrants, structural 
minorities, or even of the entire populace are restricted, this worsens the quality of 
democracy in parts but need not lead to a direct crisis of democracy as a whole. In the long 
term, however, selective restriction of such rights or effective discrimination undermine 
the normative foundations of democracy. The same is true when, with the approval of 
the majority of citizens, government authorities unilaterally cancel the trade-off between 
internal security and the freedom of opinion and information to the detriment of individual 
liberties and informational self-determination, as happened in some Western democracies 
in the aftermath of 9/11. 
D. Mutual constraints and horizontal accountability. The fourth partial regime of 
democracy under the rule of law consists in constitutional rules for the horizontal separation 
of powers. They are concerned with governmental structures and regulate the legality and 
monitoring of government action in the sense of the balanced, mutual interdependence 
and autonomy of legislature, executive, and judiciary. Governments are controlled not 
only periodically through elections but also continuously through mutually constraining 
constitutional branches of government. The independence of the judiciary and especially of 
its judges is of particular importance. The media, too, play a role as an important monitoring 
force in the form of an extra-constitutional ‘fourth estate’.
Crisis phenomena. Crises of democracy are often characterized by a shift in power between 
the executive and the legislature to the detriment of the latter. This can be a slow, creeping 
process, but it can also happen fast in the face of economic, foreign or domestic political 
crises. If parliaments lose their legislative and control powers, this is a symptom of a crisis 
whose causes and consequences have to be examined. Constitutional courts as a special 
part of the judiciary can have an ambivalent effect on democracy. Owing to their relatively 
poor democratic legitimation, they cannot act in parallel to parliament as a legislature. 
This would amount to a judicialization of politics incompatible with democracy. But, as the 
guardian of the constitution, it is their duty to prevent temporary parliamentary majorities 
from passing unconstitutional legislation (Kneip 2009). This is one reason why anti-liberal 
parties often take aim at the independence of constitutional courts and later on the 
independence of the judiciary itself. 
E. Effective governance. The fifth partial regime, the effective power to govern, determines 
that the only persons, organizations, and institutions entitled to make decisions binding on 
society as a whole are those directly legitimated in free elections or indirectly through 
nomination under constitutional law by constitutional bodies such as parliament and—with 
marked reservations—the government. A narrow framework has to be set for such indirect 
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nomination. Governments and parliaments must have the resources and decision-making 
autonomy to prevent extra-constitutional actors from usurping constitutional procedures 
and transform them in illegitimate forms of extraconstitutional private governance.
In effective and legitimate governance, too, the constitutional branches of government are 
the decisive actors. To a limited extent, supranational institutions like the European Union 
(EU) and international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the United 
Nations can intervene in the governance of individual countries. With globalization and the 
deregulation of financial markets, actors with little or no democratic legitimation such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB), big banks, hedge 
funds, and global corporate players such as Google, Microsoft, and Facebook have been 
gaining influence limiting the powers of democratically legitimated governments.
Crisis phenomena. In democracies, neither the security apparatus nor powerful companies, 
banks, or financial funds must be allowed the last word on security, financial, or economic 
policy. The activities of global institutions such as the IMF and supranational institutions like 
the ECB can be seen as a problematic limitation of the sovereign prerogatives of parliament 
and government. The democratic question arises when supranational institutions or 
external actors intervene drastically in the budgetary policy of heavily indebted countries 
such as Greece, and to a minor degree Portugal, and Spain. Most particularly in an age 
of globalization, any crisis analysis must examine the extent to which the democratic 
sovereignty of the national demos is constrained by international organizations and powers 
lacking legitimation.
The outline of the analytical concept “embedded democracy” and its major challenges 
opens a more systematic and detailed view of the strengths, resilience, but also unresolved 
challenges of many democracies within the OECD world. It also fosters our understanding 
of the interdependencies within democracy as a system. We reject the general claim 
that “democracy is in crisis”. There is no such thing in the real world as “the” democracy, 
but rather a variety of democracies. This is also the case in the European Union where 
democracies in Eastern Europe have other problems than those in Western Europe. But 
also within Western Europe we have to note that Northern democracies are more stable, 
accountable, responsive and transparent than most of the Southern ones (see inter alia 
democracybarometer.org). The main argument here is that there may be similar trends 
and challenges to democracy, but there are different responses, successes and failures in 
meeting them. We have to do more comparative empirical research in order to understand 
the dynamics of failure and success than just repeating sweeping general claims.
Against the background of the understanding that each democracy is embedded into an 
internal and external embeddedness we sketch out an analytical frame which allows us 
to connect the micro, meso, and macro levels of democracy. Such an approach opens the 
“black box democracy” to theoretically guided empirical research. The following section 
will analyse the state of the art of democracy research in order to disclose the gaps and 
lacunae which have to be filled.
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2� Challenges to Representative Democracy
In order to give a systematic overview, insight, and outlook of present and future research 
on democracy, I will disaggregate the “system” democracy into three levels. Only if we 
unbundle democracy as a whole we can understand the simultaneity of progress and 
regression, positive and negative dynamics and interdependencies of the single parts of 
democracy such as institutions, organizations, actors and procedures. After such deeper 
detailed empirical analyses we can recompose all the single parts to a whole system 
of democracy again. Doing that we understand the present and future development of 
established democracies better than only looking from a theoretical holistic perspective. We 
distinguish between three fundamental levels of democracy:
• Micro level: it includes individual participation of the citizens in elections and beyond;
• Meso level: it includes parties, party systems, interest groups, NGOs;
• Macro level: looks at the systemic performance of democracy as a whole and the 
institutional order including governments, parliaments, judiciary.
Figure 2: Micro, meso, and macro levels of democracy as a system
2�1 Micro Level: Elections and Participation
The micro level involves traditional, conventional, or new and unconventional political 
attitudes, behaviour and active participation of the citizens. At present there are profound 
changes going on at the micro level which have already been transformed into challenges at 
the meso (i.e., parties) and macro levels of representative democracy. The most prominent 
challenges at the micro level of individual political behaviour are: volatility, decline of voter 
turnout, social selectivity, polarization.
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2�1�1 Volatility
European research and statistical data show that party identification becomes less frequent 
in Western democracies. Voters base their electoral decisions on more short-term factors. 
Increasing segments of the electorate switch their party preferences from election to 
election. This can be interpreted as a democratic push of informed and enlightened rational 
voters, but on the other side it contributes to more electoral instability and unpredicted 
changes in the party system. As a consequence the formation of governmental coalition 
becomes more complex, time consuming and unpredictable.
Which are these short-term factors, why and when are they relevant for the individual 
electoral decision and how does this change the relationship between citizens and parties? 
Which is the role of emotions, facts, and “alternative” facts in politics? To which degree are 
voter preferences and decisions based on well-informed and “rational” calculus? This touches 
upon the general question how are political attitudes formed, changed and activated but 
should now be specifically linked to the changing structure and nature of the media system.
Figure 3: Volatility Party Identification
2�1�2 Decline of Voter Turnout
Electoral turnout has been declining moderately, but steadily in Western Europe (WE). In 
Eastern Europe the electoral decline is dramatic: it almost equalled the West European 
turnout in the early 1990s (slightly below 80%). In 2016 the average turnout in Eastern 
Europe (EE) amounted to 55 per cent (in WE 73%). The rapid decline in EE poses serious 
questions of legitimacy for the new democracies in the East.
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Figure 4: Decline of voters’ turnout in Western Europe and after enlargement
Figure 5: Decline of voters’ turnout it Western and Eastern Europe
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There is a growing number of citizens who abstain from elections. It is astonishing that even 
sophisticated electoral studies can tell us a lot about voters but not very much about non-
voters. We need to know more about why citizens abstain from elections, who abstains (class, 
gender, age, ethnic minorities/majorities) and under which conditions those (disenchanted) 
voters can be democratically re-politicized and activated. As shown for example by projects 
MYPLACE and PIDOP the question of age is becoming particularly relevant for the future of 
democracy. The political participation rates of young citizens in general and the electoral 
participation in specific are significantly lower than those of the total electorate in general4. 
Most recent research on the declining political interest of younger cohorts in the US mirror 
the results of those European studies (Mounk 2018, 100). The question arises whether 
this is a transitory cohort effect or the younger generation will display this lower degree of 
political and electoral behaviour throughout its life cycle. 
2�1�3 Social Selectivity
The declining electoral turnout per se is not the only legitimacy problem. But with declining 
turnouts we observe an increasing social selectivity. Those who abstain from voting are 
not the well-off in European societies, but the lower classes. The lower third seems to 
have almost dropped out from electoral participation and has never really participated in 
cognitively more demanding forms such as e-participation, deliberative forums, NGOs or 
mini-publics. Even in referenda the social selectivity bias is visibly higher than in electoral 
participation.
Projects like bEUcitizen5, GINI, LIVEWHAT, and MYPLACE examine how socio-economic 
resources can affect political participation and the exercise of political rights. European 
research shows that the greater socio-economic differences are and the concomitant 
inequality in cognitive resources among citizens, the greater political inequality will be 
(Weßels 2018)6. The greater political inequality is, the more seriously the fundamental 
democratic principle of political equality will have been contravened. At least from this 
point of view, the egalitarian societies of Scandinavia provide better conditions for equal 
democratic elections than the unequal societies of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. However, that 
plausible hypothesis needs deeper systematic knowledge than we have so far.
The equal voting rights granted by formal equality before the law is only a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for democratic elections to attain their full democratic significance. 
Democratization of democracy requires socio-economic inequality and inequalities in 
educational resources to be reduced in a manner compatible with the principles of equal 
freedom. This does not exclude “just” inequalities which are legitimated by meritocracy 
and have limits, so that they do not erode the social cohesion of the social and political 
economy. All things being equal, the less socio-economic inequality there is, the better the 
quality of democracy will be (Giebler and Merkel 2016).
There are preconditions for such a suggestive equation. One is the pluralistic assumption 
that free competition in democratic party systems also produces programmatic alternatives, 
representing different socio-economic and sociocultural interests. If this assumption is 
4 See project MYPLACE WP6 Mapping Activism, D6.3 Transnational and European level report. PIDOP 2012 
Policy Brief No. 6: What does quantitative research tell us about youth political and civic participation?
5 Report on voter turnout for the European Parliament and Political Equality in the EU (bEUcitizen Deliverable 
8.6).
6 Shown equally by project ´(see Annex)
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unfounded, elections lose much of their democratic meaning. Even the unequal distribution 
of educational resources would become largely irrelevant at the ballot box. Inequality 
between social strata in the distribution of knowledge, which also determines inequality 
in accurately choosing the right representatives, would then be unimportant if as a result 
party programmes offered no alternatives. That this is increasingly the case is a widespread 
topos in the critical debate on democracy and parties (inter alia Volkens and Merz 2018)7. 
2�1�4 Polarization
In most West European democracies political polarization has been on moderate levels 
for several decades. Political competition was characterized more by cooperation and 
centripetal tendencies. However, during the last two decades we observe an increasing 
radicalization of voter attitudes and preferences to the benefit of right-wing populist 
parties in most of the EU countries; and to a lesser degree of left-wing populist parties 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal) or anti-party movements such as in Italy. These are organizational 
manifestations of a significant discontent of citizens. While socio-economic polarization 
still matters significantly questions of cultural identity are increasingly polarizing advanced 
democratic societies. While dissatisfaction in democracies was conventionally seen as a 
major challenge (e.g., Pharr and Putnam 2000), post-Marxist (Neo-Schmittian) interpretations 
see it as a democratic chance to intensify public discourse and mobilize once disaffected 
citizens (back) into the political arena (including different forms of protest, manifestations, 
social movements, NGOs, and electoral participation) (inter alia Mouffe 2000; 2005).
Are these forms of re-politization dangerous because they often come from right-wing 
populist parties and movements or do they have unintended effects of democratizing 
democracy by filling (temporarily) a representative gap left open by established parties and 
institutions? Which effect has the identitarian polarization on the liberal and cosmopolitan 
openness of governmental policies and the democratic society as a whole?
2�1�5 Electoral Integrity
Elections, as the core of liberal democracy, are in danger of losing their democratic 
legitimacy (inter alia Norris 2014; 2015; 2017). There are allegations about electoral 
fraud, gerrymandering, voter manipulation (creation of fear, mixed messages via social 
media). Campaign finance regulations are lax and foreign states exercise their influence 
on the opinion-forming process. Traditional and electronic (social) media are increasingly 
instrumentalized by governments, contenders, populists, huge private corporations, and 
even foreign powers. These are not only defects of young unconsolidated democracies 
outside the OECD world. They already affected elections in well-established democracies 
in Europe, Japan and the US. So how and to what extent do these problems undermine 
political trust and electoral legitimacy in developed democracies? A critical review of Pippa 
7 The Chapel Hill expert surveys (partly funded by the EU) estimate party positioning on European integration, 
ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European countries. The first survey was conducted 
in 1999, with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2017. The number of countries increased from 
14 Western European countries in 1999 to 24 current or prospective EU members in 2006 to 31 countries in 
2014. The number of national parties examined has grown to 268. 
The “Party Manifesto Team” has computerized data on a large sample of electoral party programmes (ca. 60 
countries) since 1950. It can provide a fertile source to analyse the question how far those manifestos substan-
tially differ, in which political items differences are small or big, and how much this impact on voter turnout and 
trust of citizens in parties and representative institutions.
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Norris’ project on “electoral integrity” and linking those varying results—which show a 
great variety of intensity even in Europe—to the systemic question of how representative 
democracies succeed or fail in the twenty-first century is of extraordinary interest.
Within democracy research electoral studies are methodologically one of the most 
sophisticated studies. Nevertheless, there are gaps and desiderata which have to be filled by 
future research if we want to understand the most recent trends of volatility, polarization, 
turnout, and social selectivity.
Specific desiderata for electoral research focusing on the question of stability and quality 
of democracy:
• Why do citizens not vote? Under which conditions would they participate in elections?
• Why do we find rather high voter turnouts in some countries and low in others? What 
are the causes and what impact will this have on the evolution of democracy in the 
different countries? Only if we understand those causes and impacts can we design 
reforms which contribute to the strengthening of democracy without facing (too many) 
unintended consequences.
• The same questions of causes and impact have to be raised with regard to radicalization 
and polarization of significant segments of the electorate.
• There is certainly an abundance of electoral research. But too often it is either of 
descriptive nature or not linked to the “democracy” question. But when media, citizens, 
activists, and political scientists (Van Reybrouk 2016) are increasingly asking whether 
elections can be still the main legitimate procedure to translate popular sovereignty 
into democratic representation, electoral research should focus more explicitly on 
the questions of stability and quality of democracy. This in itself may strengthen the 
democratic legitimacy of elections.8 
2�2 Meso Level: Parties and Party Systems9 
Micro and meso levels are closely linked and highly independent. Attitudes, preferences 
of individual voters (demand side) cannot be understood without the supply side, namely 
the specific programmatic offers of parties. Without pretending to answer once and for all 
this demand-supply side puzzle we assume that there is often an initial unfulfilled demand 
for specific social or substantive representation among voters, which will be picked up, 
magnified and stabilized by established parties or new political entrepreneurs. This is one 
factor that explains the emergence and success of right-wing and to a minor degree also 
left-wing populism10 in Europe.
Eurobarometer has shown for more than two decades that political parties are held in low 
esteem by citizens. At present less than 20 per cent of the voters in the European Union 
8 Please see below the democratic innovative capacity of non-electoral forms of political participation (see 
chapter: Democratic Innovations: Impact on Democracy).
9 Due to limited space, we focus here primarily on the most relevant political actors, namely political parties. 
Interest groups and NGOs were only included at the level of further research needs.
10 Not all populist movements can be simply subsumed under the label “right” or “left” as the example of 
Cinque Stelle in Italy demonstrates. Cinque Stelle contains leftist as well as rightist elements in its programs and 
strategies.
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have “high trust” in political parties (Eurobarometer 2002-2016).11 Considering the fact 
that political parties are the most important intermediary organizations between society 
and state and that they are the principal or the even exclusive gatekeeper to the parliament, 
low trust and esteem are a worrying fact with respect to their democratic legitimacy and 
representative democracy as a whole. Beyond the low trust in parties, parties and party 
systems are facing the following major challenges in Europe:
• Changing forms of intermediary actors: 
At present political organizations, which can credibly distinguish themselves from the 
traditional form of parties, get rewarded in the electoral arena. Particularly relevant 
examples are: the movement “Cinque Stelle” has been the strongest “formation” in the 
parliamentary elections in Italy in 2018 (32%); Podemos scored 21.15 per cent in the 
Spanish elections of 2016 and came in third, only 1 per cent behind the Socialist Party; 
Syriza gained 35.5 per cent of the popular votes in 2015 and became by far the biggest 
party in Greece; Syriza may not be a movement, it is more a “coalition conglomerate” 
assembling several groups and movements of the Greek Left; Emmanuel Macron won the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in France in 2017 by distancing “his movement” 
La République en Marche (LREM) from traditional parties; LREM received 28.2 per cent of 
all votes in its first parliamentary election, almost twice as much as the second biggest 
party Les Republicains 15.8 per cent. Sebastian Kurz copied Macron’s strategy and gave it 
a conservative touch. He renamed the traditional Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) in Liste 
Sebastian Kurz-Neue Volkspartei Österreichs and won the Austrian elections by 31.5 per 
cent of the votes.
Despite all the ideological and programmatic differences these examples may display, they 
present themselves as parties-anti-parties different from the traditional form of political 
parties and get rewarded with electoral success. That success seems to have at least two 
causes: the distance to the traditional party form, and second, linked to the first cause, 
the distance to the political “establishment”. Political parties are probably the organization 
in representative democracy which is most severely challenged. What are the most 
pressing challenges political parties are facing and which parties are mostly affected by 
those challenges? What happens if the low appreciation rates of political parties infect 
parliaments as well? This seems to be already the case. Eurobarometer (1994-2014 Show 
that the trust of European citizens in their national parliaments and governments went 
simultaneously down from 60 per cent in 1996 to 30 per cent in 2014. What does it mean 
for the stability and quality of democracy in the longer run? We want to look closer at 
three major developments which challenge the present and the future of representative 
democracy?
• Loss of acceptance and trust in political parties
• Decline of catch-all parties
• Rise of populist parties, particularly right-wing populist parties
11 Nevertheless, the question posed by Eurobarometer is relevant, but not sufficient to understand the complex 
relationship between citizens and parties. If one were to modify the general question into the more specific one: 
“Do you trust the party you voted for”, one would get a more positive result. However, the type of question can-
not explain the total gap between general (dis)trust in parties (EU: ca. 20%) and the average turnout in Western 
Europe of ca. 72 per cent.
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2�2�1 Loss of Acceptance and Trust in Political Parties
The loss of trust towards parties is empirically well-documented. However, there are at 
least one descriptive and one causal element that are grossly under-researched and where 
we need deeper insights:
• Descriptive: Which type of political parties lost most esteem and democratic reputation: 
big, medium, small parties or catch-all, programmatic and ideological ones? To 
exemplify the substantial differentiation through the German party system: catch-all 
parties in Kirchheimer’s typology are only the Christian Democrats (CDU; and on a 
regional base: CSU); the Social Democratic Party (SPD) transited from a big catch-all 
party to a medium-size programmatic party, and the right-wing populists (AfD) and the 
Left (Die Linke) are examples of an ideological party.12 If we would know more about 
the degree of (or loss of) trust with respect to each party type, we may recognize and 
even predict better the transformation of party systems in the future. 
• Causal: Which are the motives that make citizens withdraw their respect and trust 
from (different types) of political parties? There are different hypotheses out there, but 
most of them are not thoroughly investigated from a comparative point of view. But it 
is above all the comparison which helps us reveal common and divergent patterns and 
trends. Those hypotheses are: 
◊ Political parties, big catch-all parties in particular cannot be distinguished from 
one another regarding their programmatic positions in crucial policy areas such 
as fiscal, social, or foreign policies. And even if the programmes still differ, those 
differences disappear when they are in government.
◊ Political parties do not deliver and do not stick to their electoral promises. If parties 
campaign with the promise to reduce unemployment, poverty, or to enhance physical 
or social security, and at the end of the governmental period these promises are 
neither objectively fulfilled nor visibly pursued by the governing parties voters may 
be disappointed. They either change party, drop out from elections or may even 
withdraw their active support to democracy as a whole.
◊ Party elites are considered as pure office seekers. If such an impression spread 
massively among citizens, distrust against political elites will rise. They will be 
considered as a self-serving political class. 
◊ Citizens still mistrust non-transparent party apparatuses. Although those 
apparatuses are certainly more transparent than those in the nineteen fifties and 
sixties or the internal decision making of charismatically directed “movement 
parties” from Cinque Stelle to Macron’s En Marche, they are paradoxically more 
under suspicion than the decisions taken by functionaries and the top elites. What 
are the reasons that party elites are especially considered as a political class far 
away from the people?
Insights into the dynamics of descriptive and causal elements of the present transformation 
of parties and party systems allow us to some extent to predict future developments. 
Without those plausible and empirically grounded predictions meaningful democratic 
political reforms cannot be expected.
12 There is a thin line between “programmatic” and “ideological” parties. Programmatic parties allow for trans-
parency, voter information, and holding parties accountable on their programmatic promises. Their impact on 
democracy is positive. Ideological parties are radicalized programmatic parties that subsume their programmatic 
standpoints under a specific worldview, such as nationalism or communism. The more intransigent and radica-
lized the ideology is, the more problematic these parties become for democracy.
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2�2�2 Decline of Catch-all Parties
Catch-all parties (people’s parties, Volksparteien)13 have been the dominant political actors 
in European post-war democracies (Kirchheimer 1965; Mair 2014). They dominated the 
dynamics of electoral competition, populated the parliaments, and were the “natural” leaders 
of most governing coalitions in Western Europe. Moreover, they functioned objectively as 
“political integration machines” for society building inside their own organization bridges 
between different cleavages, classes, religions, and milieus14.
The high time of post-war catch-all parties ended in 1985 (see fig. 6) and since then we are 
witnessing a steady and strong decline of those parties without major oscillations. There 
are four relevant symptoms which emphasize that decline: continuous loss of voters; a 
dramatic decline in membership; ageing of the members15. 
Electoral decline: While catch-all parties scored in each of the West European countries 
an average of 60 per cent in 1985, they received less than 40 per cent in 2015. In some 
countries such as Sweden, Austria, and Germany where one catch-all party alone scored 
between 40 and 50 per cent, or together more than 90 per cent (Austria, Germany) they are 
down at a level of between 20 and 30 per cent. In some other countries such as France, the 
Netherlands, or Italy they do not exist anymore.
Figure 6: Decline of catch-all parties since 1960
Source: WZB Data Bank: Elections, Parties, Governments.
13 We are using the term “catch-all parties” since it is commonly applied in Anglo-Saxon party research. Howe-
ver, most of those parties would never call themselves “catch-all”. They consider the term pejorative and often 
name themselves “people’s party” or “Volkspartei”, which refers more strongly to the common good and the 
people as a whole.
14 Jan Rovny and Jonathan Polk. “New Wine in Old Bottles: Explaining Party Competition Along the Socio-Cultu-
ral Dimension in Europe.” Last presented at APSA 2015, San Francisco.
15 The average age of the party members of SPD and CDU lies at 60 years.
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Catch-all parties manifested themselves mostly in two subtypes: centre-right (Christian 
Democratic or Conservative Parties) and centre-left parties (typically Social Democratic 
parties)16. None of the two were spared from the steady decline (see fig. 6).
Figure 7: Decline of centre-right and centre-left (Social Democratic catch-all 
parties)
Source: WZB Data Base: Elections, Parties, Governments.
According to European research the electoral decline of centre-right catch-all parties, 
typically Christian Democratic or conservative parties, set in earlier from a higher level 
in 1960 (ca. 45%), seemed to stabilize between 1980 and 1995 on a 10-per cent lower 
level, before falling after 2000 to 28 per cent (in 2015). The decline of centre-left catch-all 
parties, mostly Social Democrats, started shortly before the year 2000 and fell from 38 
per cent to 27 per cent in 2015. On average across Europe the vote for social democratic, 
Christian democratic, conservative and liberal parties fell from 75 per cent in the first 
national elections after 2000 to 64 per cent in the national election prior to January 2017. 
With few exceptions, these parties have continued to support European integration at a time 
of increasing scepticism.17  
The statistically robust decline appears as an irreversible demise if one looks at the other 
symptoms and later also on its short and long-term causes.
Membership decline
The electoral stability of catch-all parties relied to a large extent on the high membership 
those parties had (and vice versa). Since 1975 the membership of both types of catch-all 
16 There are also exceptions to the classification rule of centre-left and centre-right catch-all party families. 
In Ireland, for example, Fianna Fáil, a national catch-all party par excellence, does not fall in either of the two 
subtypes, whereas the Irish Labour Party never made it to a catch-all party.
17 Hooghe and Marks (2017) EUENGAGE; also: Hooghe and Marks (2017), Rovny and Polk (2015).
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parties has dropped from 500,000 per party type (average) to ca. 210,000 (centre-right) or 
even to 185,000 (centre-left). The German SPD lost half a million members between 1990 
and 2010 and therewith more than half of its membership (1990: 1 million). 
Here we need further research from a comparative perspective: which are the causes, 
why the membership exit may have stopped in some countries (Germany) and reached 
dramatic bottom lines in others (Netherlands, France, Italy, Eastern Europe); what are the 
consequences if two catch-all parties can still attract a 70-per cent voter base in one political 
system (in Austria), but the party membership has become smaller and smaller? What does 
it mean if we see a dwindling electorate and a completely insignificant membership base in 
Eastern Europe? Can big parties or parties in general fulfil their functions as prime agents 
between society and state in representative democracies?
Ageing membership
Simultaneously to the decline of membership and causally connected to it we observe 
an ongoing ageing of party membership. In Germany the average age of CDU/CSU and 
SPD party members is around 60 years. This is also mirrored by catch-all parties in other 
countries such as Austria and the Netherlands. What does the age asymmetry mean for the 
representativeness of those party organizations, for their programmes and policies? Will 
they represent more the interests of the older generations (past) and lose their innovative 
capacity because the younger generation does not join political parties anymore? Why are 
party members of some types of parties younger than in others? Do we have specific 
differences between countries? And if yes, what are the causes and consequences of it?
Here we need more empirical work from a comparative point of views. The common topics of 
those comparisons should be inter alia: which patterns, which causes, which consequences 
for participation, representation, programmes, and policies.
Competition for the median voter
It has been a kind of iron law in electoral research that elections in advanced democracies 
will be won by the median voter (Downs 1957). This worked for most of the post-war 
decades. Especially the catch-all parties moved to the centre of the party system. Centripetal 
competition was the consequence. This was evident in the Third Way of Social Democracy 
(Giddens 1998; Merkel 2001). It worked successfully for a few years for the Labour Party in 
the UK, the SPD in Germany, the SPÖ in Austria, the PD in Italy, and PSOE in Spain (Merkel 
et al. 2008). However, after a relatively short time span Third-Way Social Democracy paid a 
high electoral prize. They lost votes to the left-socialist parties which established themselves 
in the unoccupied political space to their left. Those leftist parties significantly increased 
their vote share and established themselves firmly in the party system, partly on traditional 
social democratic ground. Therefore in the mid- and long-term, Social Democracy lost 
voters not only as a result of secular employment shifts from industry to services, but also 
due to its own strategic mistakes. What paid off for some of them in the short run (before 
and after 2000) reduced their political and electoral space in the longer term.
Almost synchronously, Christian Democratic parties ran into a similar median voter trap. 
On their ruthless search for the median voter most of Christian Democratic parties moved 
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to the centre (Germany, Austria until most recently,18 the Netherlands) and left the political 
space right of the centre largely unoccupied. Christian Democratic parties watered down 
their conservative core identity, trying to become centre catch-all parties. It was right-
wing populist parties that moved successfully into this right-conservative political space, 
increasingly adding authoritarian working class votes from the declining socialist and social 
democratic parties.
What impact does the ongoing decline of catch-all parties have on the stability, quality, and 
inclusiveness of democracy and where do we need further research.
Need for further research
The general hypothesis is: The long enduring decline of catch-all parties has both positive 
and negative impacts on the quality and stability of democracy. However, the negative 
consequences prevail. The formation of stable and programmatically coherent governmental 
party coalitions has become almost impossible. Either we find rather heterogeneous multi-
party coalitions or so-called Grand Coalitions where the two strongest parties are no longer 
Grand Coalitions but minimum winning coalitions (such as in Germany in 2018). What is 
different from the period between the 1960s and the 1990s is that those parties gained 
barely over 50 per cent and no longer 80-90 per cent. Within those minimal winning 
coalitions an intensive competition takes place since those once big parties are now eager 
to profile themselves at the expense of the other. 
• What distinguishes today’s “Grand Coalitions” from “Grand Coalitions” of the past?
• What distinguish multi-party coalitions from two-party minimal winning coalitions of 
the decades before 2000?
• Are they more stable, more capable to formulate and implement coherent policy 
programmes?
• How do the voters perceive the different governmental coalitions in terms of 
representation and decision making?
• Does the loss of trust among citizens vis-à-vis governments signal a negative perception 
of the multi-party or grand-coalition government (see Eurobarometer 1990-2016).
2�2�3 Rise of Populist Parties, Particularly Right-wing Populist Parties19 
At present right-wing populism and nativism (RWP) pose great challenges to liberal 
democracy in Europe and North America. Its electoral successes in Western and Eastern 
Europe are impressive and alarming. The governments of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
have been taken over by coalitions where right-wing-populist parties (RWPs) or populists of 
the centre-left play a dominant role.20 These are by no means isolated occurrences confined 
to the new democracies of Eastern and East-Central Europe. Right-wing populist parties 
had begun to challenge the liberal elements of democracies in Western Europe some time 
ago. They joined governing coalitions in Italy, Austria, and Switzerland during the 1990s 
18 In 2016, Sebastian Kurz, the chairman of the party and later the Chancellor of Austria, successfully changed 
the organizational form and the leadership style of the party, which obviously helped him to win the 2017 
elections.
19 This paragraph on RWPs draws extensively on my recently co-authored article “Illiberalism, Populism and 
Democracy in East and West” (Merkel and Scholl 2018). See also in the same journal: Hanspeter Kriesi and Attila 
Ágh.
20 The specific type of right plus left-wing populism of SMER (Slovakia) cannot be discussed here. The Czech 
government is led by the anti-establishment, populist ANO party of billionaire Andrej Babiš.
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and after 2000. At present (in 2018), they constitute the biggest parliamentary party 
in Switzerland and the second largest in the Netherlands and in the French presidential 
elections. Right-wing populist parties have become strong even in Scandinavia, where we 
find the qualitatively best democracies of the globe. They have joined coalition governments 
such as in Finland and Norway or informally support governing coalitions as in Denmark. 
They increasingly set the tone in public discourse on crucial issues such as migration, Islam, 
and even the EU. One result of the growing strength of Scandinavia’s RWP has been the 
significant decline of social democracy, once the dominating political force in the Nordic 
countries.
The populist traits of the successful Brexit campaign21 and, last but not least, of Trump’s 
election as president of the United States of America have shown that right-wing populism 
appears to be a ubiquitous phenomenon among young and old, well-developed democracies 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, in none of those old and new advanced 
democracies have right-wing parties dominated politics as ruling parties as strongly as in 
Hungary and—to a lesser degree—in Poland.
However, if we want to broaden our view theoretically and empirically and if we want to 
examine the relationship between right-wing populism and democracy, we have to answer 
the following three key questions: 
• What are the causes of the emergence of illiberalism and populism?
• Are illiberalism and populism in the East different from those in the West?
• Is (right-wing) populism a threat to democracy?
What are the causes of the emergence of illiberalism and right-wing populism?
We argue that an economic and cultural-discursive representation gap allowed populist 
discourses to enter and occupy this space. If we want to find out whether the right-wing 
populist occupation of that political space will endure and if we cannot rely on purely 
constructivist and discursive explanations alone, we may look for the underlying structural 
causes.
2�2�4 Cosmopolitans and Communitarians: A New Cleavage in Europe 
and Beyond
European research suggests that a new cleavage is emerging in Western and Eastern 
Europe, and even beyond. It partially crosscuts and overlaps with the traditional left-right 
distributional cleavages. It basically consists of an economic, and (even more) a cultural 
conflict between cosmopolitans and communitarians (Kriesi et al. 2008; Inglehart and Norris 
2016; De Wilde et al. 2019, forthcoming). EUENGAGE shows that in particular the euro and 
the migration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a transnational 
cleavage (overlapping to a great extent with the cosmopolitan, communitarian one). These 
crises have raised the salience of European Integration and migration in public debate, 
intensified divisions within mainstream parties and have led to an upsurge of rejectionist 
political parties (Hooghe and Marks 2017). 
21 We do not subsume the whole Brexit campaign or Trump’s electoral success under the label of right-wing 
populism. The Brexit campaign also had strong traits of leftist anti-EU attitudes and Trump’s victory was based 
on the strength of the Republican Party as well. Nevertheless, the specific dynamics of both campaigns was 
driven by right-wing populist rhetoric.
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The Programmatic Evolution of Right-wing Populism (RWP)
In Europe we can recognize four thematic waves of radical right-wing populist opposition to 
traditional democratic policies, politics, and in some countries even polities:
• Anti-Tax State: In the 1970s, “neo-liberal populist” parties emerged in Denmark and 
Norway campaigning against inefficient bureaucracies and government spending and 
for “downsizing” bloated high-tax welfare states. These parties were characterized 
by an economically right-wing libertarian stance (Ignazi 1992). Today, rather than 
opposing economic redistribution in principle, most populist right-wing parties adopted 
economically leftist policies, while promoting the need for exclusion of specific groups 
from welfare benefits and the labour market—first and foremost immigrants—in order 
to provide social protection for so-called natives. This programmatic shift from radical 
economic liberalism to “welfare chauvinism” (Kitschelt and McGann 1997) is hardly 
surprising considering that the electoral base of populist parties typically comprised 
the lower educated, who had little interest in a severe cutback of welfare entitlements.
• Anti-European Integration: In the 1990s, opposition to European integration became a 
second critical issue of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Populists around 
Europe addressed existing democracy deficits of the European Union (EU) and claimed 
that the “corrupt institutions” in Brussels had betrayed the people, demanding that 
sovereignty needs to be taken back from supranational institutions to the people. High 
levels of Euroscepticism have also been shown to be one of the factors driving RWP 
voting on the micro level in many countries (Werts et al. 2013).
• Anti-Liberalism: The third thematic wave of right-wing populism can be described as 
a general opposition to liberalism and multiculturalism. In the late 1980s and in the 
1990s, RWPs took an increasingly authoritarian stance on sociocultural issues, such as 
immigration, the criminal justice system, and minority rights. They favoured the pure 
will of “the people” in a majoritarian sense over the institutions of liberal democracies, 
civil rights, constitutionalism, and judicial review (Rovira Kaltwasser 2012).
• Anti-Islam. After 2000, populist right-wing parties increasingly turned against Islam, 
migration, refugees, and open borders. Migration, especially from non-European 
countries and among these particularly from Muslim-majority countries, was seen 
as both a threat to national homogeneity, internal security, and eventually societal 
peace. Immigration has become a highly contentious cultural-identitarian question 
about the compatibility of Islamic culture and European liberal democracy rather than 
a mere socio-economic challenge (Betz 2013). Anti-immigration stances had become 
so abundant in the RWPs’ discourses that some scholars now use the term “Anti-
Immigrant Parties” (Art 2011). These positions against Islam, immigrants, and refugees 
have become so dominant in RWPs’ electoral campaigns that it is possible to speak of 
a new phase during the last decade. 
• Which are the issues RWPs are mobilising most successfully? Why is this case? Which 
variety can we discover across countries? What have been the programmatic responses 
of the established parties?
Electoral Features of Right-wing Populism
Figure 5 illustrates important differences between RWPs in Eastern and Western Europe. 
The vote share of populist right-wing parties in Western Europe has been rising almost 
steadily since the 1980s and reached its preliminary peak in 2016 with an average of 
just over 9 per cent. In Eastern Europe, RWPs have gained considerable vote shares since 
the first democratic elections and witnessed a sharp increase in the early 2000s; with an 
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average vote share of 15 per cent, their electoral appeal had tripled by 2016. If we consider 
only countries with right-wing populist parties, the average vote share increases to 12 per 
cent in Western Europe and over 16 per cent in Eastern Europe (see fig. 8). However, in 
some countries like Poland, Hungary, or Switzerland and Austria, RWPs have gained much 
larger vote shares than that. If we take a look at voter turnout, there is a similar pattern. 
In Western Europe, turnout had not been decreasing substantially until 1985, but it started 
to slowly decline just as RWPs attracted more and more voters. In Eastern Europe (see 
Rovny and Polk 2015), average turnout was considerably high until 1995 at around 75 per 
cent but dropped dramatically to below 55 per cent in the mid-2000s. Thereafter turnout 
stabilized at a low level, while RWPs’ vote shares were on the rise. This indicates that 
there was a representation gap that has been filled by RWPs. People who did not support 
open borders in the broadest sense and were disenchanted by the liberal transformation 
their countries experienced since the collapse of the Soviet Union were attracted by RWPs. 
In Western Europe, the nostalgic backlash against cultural modernization and economic 
globalization is the almost logical reaction of a less educated, predominantly male lower 
and lower middle class as well as conservatives across all social strata who felt excluded by 
the dominant cosmopolitan discourse of the ruling elites (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Merkel 
2018a). From this perspective, the populist revolt can be interpreted as a reaction to the 
discursive hegemony of a moralistic cosmopolitanism of the established parties and media 
and the better-to-do within democratic societies. This distancing between citizens and 
political elites is one of the reasons for the success of populist parties (EUENGAGE; D4.4).
Figure 8: Right-wing populist parties’ vote share (1950-2016)
Note: Annual averages, EU member states and Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
Source: WZB Database “Elections, Parties, Governments”.
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The average electoral share of 16 per cent and 12 per cent in the East and West, respectively, 
belies the significant electoral success of RWPs in Hungary, Poland, Switzerland, Denmark, 
France and Austria. In most of these countries, RWPs have entered national governments 
not once, but several times (see below).
Right-wing populist voters are overrepresented among citizens with low formal education 
and a below-average household income as well as among men. Figure 9 displays the 
ratio of RWP voters’ education levels to those of the overall population, using data from 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)22. In all countries except Slovenia23, a 
disproportionate share of RWP voters has primary education only. Ranging from about 120 
per cent to 140 per cent, low-educated voters are strongly overrepresented in the electoral 
bases of RWPs. In addition, people with secondary education tend to vote for RWPs over-
proportionally, even if the effect is somewhat less pronounced. In contrast, highly educated 
people are consistently underrepresented in the voter bases of RWPs. In Switzerland, where 
the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) has almost become a mainstream party, this divide 
is less pronounced. In Hungary, where two thirds of the voters opted for either the radical 
right-wing party Jobbik or the right-wing populist party Fidesz in 2018, the right-wing 
populist electorate reflects the social structure of the whole society. In all other countries, 
the electorate in both Eastern and Western Europe is clearly divided by education. Voters 
with post-secondary education are underrepresented by 40 to 60 per cent in the voter 
bases of RWPs. This is in line with the rich body of literature dealing with education, class 
affiliation, or economic well-being and RWP voting (Oesch 2008; Rydgren 2012; Spittler 
2018).
Figure 9: Ratio of right-wing voters’ education/population (1996-2010)
Source: Cumulated CSES Study Series 1-3.
22 We used the combined Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Series 1-3.
23 The exceptional case of Slovenia needs further research.
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Figure 10: Ratio of right-wing voters’ household income and public (1997-
2010)
Source: Cumulated CSES Study Series 1-3.
The structure of formal education and right-wing populist voting preference is linked to 
and reflected by the structure of household incomes and voting preference for right-wing 
populist parties. Citizens with higher incomes are significantly underrepresented and citizens 
from below-average income households are grossly overrepresented.
The data also show that there is a clear divide by gender. Men are much more likely than 
women to vote for right-wing populist parties. Figure 11 displays the ratio of male over 
female RWP voters. Interestingly, this connection seems to be more pronounced in Eastern 
Europe. Male voters are overrepresented by 45 per cent in the Czech Republic and by 10 
to 25 per cent in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany. Right-wing populist parties are 
clearly male parties, which has led some scholars to name them “men parties” (Mudde 
2007, 90-118; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Spittler 2018). Class affiliation also seems to 
be a better predictor for RWP voting for men than it is for women (Coffé 2012). However, 
surprisingly little research has been conducted on the relationship between gender and RWP 
voting, especially for the Eastern European cases. 
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Figure 11: Ratio of male over female right-wing voters (1996-2010)
Source: Cumulated CSES Study Series 1-3.
Further Research Needs
The sociostructural composition of parties’ electoral base needs more systematic research 
with more variables, extending to all European countries and showing the transnational 
commonalities and national differences. Only then can we systematically explore and try 
to explain which factors and developments explain the varying levels of success of RWP 
parties in Europe. An initial explanation will be given below. 
The Structural Cause: A New Cleavage
The underlying structural cause for a possibly enduring electoral and political success of 
RWP may be a new cleavage (see De Wilde et al. 2019, forthcoming).
 We see strong indications that such a cleavage has been emerging during the last two 
decades in Western and Eastern Europa. More recently it gained great impetus from 
the Euro- and migration crises. However, it is a politico-cultural cleavage which partially 
overlaps, but also crosscuts the traditional socio-economic cleavage between left and right. 
The new cleavage can be termed cosmopolitan versus communitarians.
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Figure 12: Two main cleavages in advanced democracies
Source: Own figure.
Who are cosmopolitans, who are communitarians, and what determines their conflict? Ideal-
typically, cosmopolitans have above-average levels of education, higher incomes and high 
levels of human and cultural capital; they prefer multiculturalism, reject cultural assimilation, 
and are geographically and professionally highly mobile. They opt for open borders for goods, 
services, capital, labour, refugees, asylum seekers, and trans- or supranational governance. 
They are highly in favour of further European integration and identify themselves rather 
as world citizens than with nation states or local communities. Cosmopolitans also opt for 
“open borders” and equality with respect to gender and sexual orientation. They believe 
that traditional gender roles need to be overcome, which particularly finds expression in a 
strong advocacy of equality between men and women, but also in a preference for gender-
neutral language and education. They tend to believe that there are not one or two sexual 
orientations, but a whole variety and therefore favour equal rights for sexual minorities in 
the form of gay marriage, adoption rights for homosexual couples, and unisex public toilets, 
to name just a few issues that were raised in recent debates. Cosmopolitans tend to be the 
winners of globalization in economic and sociocultural terms. 
Communitarians display many of the opposite characteristics. They are less educated, 
have lower incomes, are less mobile, have less human and cultural capital, and are 
professionally less mobile beyond their homelands. They reject multiculturalism and display 
Euroscepticism. Communitarians also tend to prefer traditional “borders” regarding gender 
identities and sexual minorities. They often advocate traditional gender roles and reject 
the notion of a non-binary gender system. They typically oppose the extension of sexual 
minorities’ rights, emphasizing the need for distinguishing traditional sexual identities from 
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other sexual orientations.24 In short, communitarians tend to be the losers of globalisation 
and even have rational interests in strengthening the nation state and its capacity to close 
and control borders (Merkel and Zürn 2019, forthcoming).
These are ideal-typical constructions. In reality, many individuals do not possess all of these 
characteristics. However, the more they do, the more these two camps can be identified as 
the poles of the cleavage. The larger the camps, the greater are the incentives for political 
entrepreneurs to mobilize along such a cleavage. There is thus an initial demand for new 
political offerings; political entrepreneurs supply new programmatic offerings via new or old 
organizations (parties). Political demand and supply have a mutually reinforcing effect. The 
question arises, then, whether there was such a societal demand for illiberal or populist-
illiberal programmatic supply to begin with, and if so, why this is the case.
A most recent study of the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Berlin Social Science Center 
(WZB) investigated the populist potential of the German society by asking 3400 persons. 
The study found out inter alia that there is a growing “populism of the centre” which is 
increasingly receptive to programmatic offers from the right, meaning the “Alternative für 
Deutschland” (AFD) (see Vehrkamp and Merkel 2018).
Further Research Needs
Our general hypothesis is that economic and cultural globalization have stimulated a 
demand for renationalization, social protection, security from alienation, and reassertion 
of a “Leitkultur” among potential communitarians with low education and precarious social 
and professional conditions. But we have to know more:
• What matters more—the economic or the cultural causes? 
• How does education matter for the positioning as communitarian or cosmopolitan? 
• What fortifies the cleavages between those two camps?
• How large are the two camps in different countries?
• Are Pippa Norris and Ron Inglehart right to claim that it is above all the cultural divide 
that mattered most (see also Inglehart and Norris 2016). Those who see themselves 
as the losers of economic and cultural globalisation also found themselves not 
represented in the public discourse where, at least in Western Europe, cosmopolitans 
have established a cultural hegemony. 
2�3 Macro Level: Political Challenges to the Democratic System
The challenges to democracy and their impact on it have been often analysed in dispersed 
and fragmented empirical analyses without any systemic perspective or in more theoretical 
analyses with scattered empirical references (e.g., Della Porta 2013; Mounk 2018); 
sometimes even with sweeping claims with little empirical evidence. Both are legitimate 
scientific enterprises in their own right. However, they have to be either supported by 
sound empirical evidence or combined and guided by a theoretically elaborated concept 
that explains the interdependencies of the relevant institutions, procedures, and actors of 
democracy (for an initial more systematic analysis of the EU or OECD countries see Merkel 
and Kneip (2018).
24 Nonetheless, some RWPs such as the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the National Front in France, or even 
the AfD in Germany have become more open with respect to sexual identity and incorporated well-known homo-
sexuals in their leaderships, while articulating this openness as a contrast to the supposed intolerance of Islam 
(Kim 2017).
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The concept of “embedded democracy” or a thorough analysis of the major challenges to 
the micro, meso, and macro analyses can guide such a comprehensive view.
Here we want to give some highly relevant examples of major challenges to democracy 
and their observable impact on the workings of democracy. These examples are far from 
complete or sufficiently researched.
2�3�1 How Dangerous is Right-wing Populism for Liberal Democracy?25 
We already argued that RWPs often launch an illiberal attack against the liberal dimension 
of democracy. They argue against the “hyper-liberal” elements of advanced democracies on 
the basis of the other dimension of democracy, the “sovereignty of the people”, understood 
in a simple majoritarian sense. Winning an electoral majority legitimates the government to 
rule on that basis even against liberal individual rights or group rights. 
“Illiberal democracy,” a term originally coined by Fareed Zakaria (1997) and introduced to 
the political science literature and regime research by Wolfgang Merkel and colleagues 
(Merkel 2004) as one of the subtypes of “defective democracy”, has taken on acute political 
relevance since 2014 at the latest, when Viktor Orbán declared in a well-known speech that 
in Hungary, “the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state26.” 
Orbán’s illiberal project, among other examples, has given rise to renewed debate on the 
relationship between liberalism and democracy. Jan-Werner Müller (2016) has repeatedly 
argued that the “illiberal democracy” label is inappropriate for describing a regime that is, 
in reality, illiberal and undemocratic; he argues that the systematic dismantling of checks 
and balances and the rule of law has to be understood as an attack not only on liberalism, 
but on the very foundations of democracy as such. From this perspective, the proliferation 
of “diminished subtypes” such as illiberal democracy or “managed democracy” (to describe 
Putin’s Russia) in social science discourse can be seen as deeply problematic insofar as 
they reproduce the self-presentations of more or less authoritarian regimes that would, of 
course, like to be democratic but can hardly be classified as such upon serious analysis. We 
argue nevertheless that labelling RWP regimes simply as non-democratic or authoritarian 
in the same vein as Putin’s “managed (non-)democracy” cannot grasp the different 
character of those regimes. Illiberal democracies are not simply authoritarian regimes; 
they are a “diminished subtype” (Collier and Levitsky 1997) of democracy that erode the 
liberal dimension of individual rights, group rights, and the rule of law by claiming that 
the “sovereignty of the people” expressed in political majorities trumps individual rights. In 
extreme cases, this can lead to “tyrannies of the majority” of which Alexis de Tocqueville 
already warned us in his book “Democracy in America” (1835).
Another way of approaching the relationship between liberalism and democracy is, with 
Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005) and others, to view liberal democracy as a contingent 
articulation of two logics that are ultimately irreconcilable with each other: liberalism as 
the defence of individual freedoms and the rule of law and democracy as the contestation 
over the sovereignty of the people. This is not to say that the two cannot ever function in 
more or less harmony, but that disharmony will always (re-)emerge at some point and 
that harmony is not the historically “normal” state of affairs. Indeed, the last decades have 
25 I thank my collaborator Seongcheol Kim at the WZB for providing most of the thoughts and arguments of 
this paragraph.
26 Available at: https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-
26-july-2014/
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witnessed a double process: on the one hand, many of the OECD democracies have seen 
the democratization of democracy by strengthening the liberal rights of individuals and 
groups. On the other hand, many of those countries have contributed to the liberalization 
and deregulation of markets. Democratically elected elites have disempowered themselves. 
The “liberal façade” (Streeck 2016) was kept, but bereft of substantial democratic influence 
in economic matters. This is what theorists of various stripes (from Jacques Rancière 
and Yannis Stavrakakis to Colin Crouch) have called post-democracy (see above), where 
the dictates of economic elites are systematically privileged over democratic processes; 
Mouffe speaks in a similar vein of “post-politics,” where the neo-liberal economic consensus 
denies the need for democratic conflict. From this perspective, then, the “illiberalization of 
democracy” was long preceded by the de-democratization of liberalism. 
Mouffe’s critique of “post-politics” can be interpreted to the effect that illiberal populism 
emerges as an Other of post-democratic liberalism: as much as the former appears to 
constitute a reaction to the latter, what is common to both is that they play off liberalism 
and democracy against one another—by attacking minority rights in the name of the 
sovereignty of the people or, conversely, by denying the relevance of popular sovereignty in 
the name of economic rationality. Another way of reading this is that a properly democratic 
populism opposes liberalism not on the terrain of individual and minority rights and the 
rule of law, but on that of economic (neo-)liberalism with its deeply problematic effects on 
democracy. One does not have to fully share the premises of Mouffe’s “radical democracy”. 
But this different perspective opens up alternative insights into the anti-liberal reactions 
that can be seen in many OECD democracies. It has key implications for how to understand 
the ubiquitous phenomenon of “populism”.
Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) understand populism as a form 
of “democratic illiberalism” that, can be a threat or corrective to democracy; Margaret 
Canovan (2002) holds that populism emerges from a fundamental trade-off between the 
inclusiveness of a democracy and its proximity to popular control (which she calls “the 
democratic paradox”). What is common to all these approaches is that whether populism 
attacks individual and minority rights or an economic power elite is indeterminate: populism 
can just as well be a force opposing the de-democratization of liberalism rather than 
contributing to the “illiberalization of democracy.”
Research Needs
Do the different theoretical approaches allow for multifaceted perspectives on the 
phenomenon of RWPs? Here are some examples of how these theories might be translated 
into questions for empirical research: 
• Is democracy—or better, which types of democracies—strong enough to transform the 
populist challenges productively into reforms that respond to the representation gap 
left open by the established parties and depolarize the emerging cleavage between 
cosmopolitan winners and communitarian losers?
• What might be the most successful strategies for doing so? 
◊ Systematically we can distinguish between: ban, isolate, defuse, ignore, coopt, 
adopt, coalize. We have now a sufficient number of cases for each strategy in 
many East- and West European countries. However, there is no systematic 
empirical research about the emergence, implementation, and the consequences 
of those strategies on the electoral success of RWP and the stability and quality 
of democracy as a whole.
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◊ Moving to the right and reformulating RWP demands in a more moderate and 
conservative mode that is compatible with the rules and culture of democracy?
◊ Ignoring the demands and insisting that there is no democratic alternative to 
(hyper-)liberal politics?
◊ Depriving RWPs of their capacity to mobilize protest in opposition by including 
them in government and “civilizing” them under the imperative of governmental 
responsibility?
• What impacts do RWP electoral successes have on consolidated democracies in the 
West, or on young democracies in the East?
• What effects do RWPs have when they are in opposition and when they are in 
government?
• What impacts do RWPs have when they are junior or senior partners in governing 
coalitions?
We certainly need more empirical research on these questions. We know about RWPs that 
the electorate is over-proportionally male with below-average levels of formal education 
and income. But we do not know how this is changing over time. 
• What causes the differences across countries, and above all what impact do RWPs have 
on democracy when they are in opposition and when they are in government? 
• The impact can be on sensitive policies such as immigration, refugee issues, or 
European integration; will the result be a shift to the right in these critical policy areas? 
Is this the only way the established parties can reconquer the political space lost to 
the RWPs—by moving the general policy coordinates to the right? But there will be an 
impact on politics as well. 
• How do RWPs change important parameters of electoral competition? Do the changing 
dynamics lead to higher polarization and volatility? Do they change the coalition 
behaviour of established parties? 
• What about the polity? Do RWPs as dominant parties within governing coalitions always 
challenge the independence of the judiciary? Do they use public and private media 
to attack “mainstream media”? Under which conditions do they fail or when do they 
succeed?
Is illiberal democracy the only threat to liberal representative democracies on the level of 
the nation state?27 The counterpart to illiberal democracy proposed by cosmopolitans is not 
simply the status-quo liberal democracy, but liberal “cosmopolitan democracy”.
2�3�2 Cosmopolitan Democracy: How Democratic is it?28 
Cosmopolitans claim the moral high ground in questions of universal rights and solidarity 
with refugees. But do they also have the better concept of democracy? Although 
cosmopolitans accept that democracy can only be conceptualized as multilevel governance, 
they appear to theorize mainly about democracy beyond the nation state, while democracy 
within the nation state is of secondary interest. The core idea of cosmopolitan democracy 
27 Later on, we will try to integrate nation-state democracy into an already existing multilevel system of demo-
cratic governance. We will not simply argue that such a multilevel regime is the most democratic response to 
the challenges of the twenty-first century. This depends on the balance between the different levels and whether 
the latter can accumulate sufficient democratic legitimacy without falling into the trap of nationalism on the one 
hand and of technocracy on the other.
28 This chapter draws intensively on Merkel and Zürn (2019, forthcoming).
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is to democratize international institutions (Held 1995; Zürn 1998), or as Daniele Archibugi 
puts it: “to globalize democracy, while at the same time, democratizing globalization” (2004, 
434). Of the “seven assumptions” of cosmopolitan democracy, Archibugi emphasizes the 
following three as essential (ibid., 439):
• “Global democracy is not just the achievement of democracy within each state.
• “Globalization erodes states’ political autonomy and thereby curtails the efficacy of 
state-based democracy.
• “‘The stakeholders’ communities in a relevant and growing number of specific issues do 
not necessarily coincide with states’ territorial borders.”
Cosmopolitans opt for the concession of nation-state sovereignty rights to international 
organizations and supranational regimes, if not the vision of a democratic world government, 
a world parliament, and a global civil society (see Archibugi and Held 1995; Keane 2003; 
Archibugi 2008). They argue in favour of authority transfers to the UN and to the EU, 
free-trade agreements and the IMF, world climate conferences and a fiscal union in the 
Eurozone, strong human rights regimes on the global level, and institutions allowing for 
global redistribution. This cosmopolitan argument in favour of strong political institutions 
beyond the nation state is based on two pillars: a functionalist and a normative one. 
Functionalists argue that today’s world is so tightly connected that the growing number 
of transnational problems can only be solved effectively beyond the nation-state level. 
The nation state, they argue, has to come to terms with being embedded in a multilevel 
system. The effectiveness of transnational action thus becomes the reason for pooled and 
delegated sovereignty.
However, these effectiveness gains come with losses in the quality of democratic procedures 
in terms of participation, deliberation, and transparency when the decision-making process 
is moved beyond the nation state. If the transfer of nation-state sovereignty rights to 
supranational regimes or international organizations do indeed contribute to an increased 
problem-solving capacity (e.g., free trade, economic welfare, climate change, human rights, 
peace and security) that cannot be achieved on the democratic nation-state level alone, the 
discussion of normative trade-offs and of empirical research has to begin.
Research Needs
• Is there a loss of democratic goods such as equal participation and representation, 
clear accountability, transparency, or control of the decision makers? 
• How relevant are these “democratic losses”? 
• How big are the efficiency and effectiveness gains on the supranational level? 
• How can one justify these potential trade-offs between output legitimacy on the one 
hand and input or throughput legitimacy on the other (Merkel and Kneip 2018)? 
Apart from this functionalist perspective widespread in global governance studies and in the 
field of International Relations, normatively oriented cosmopolitan scholars such as Thomas 
Pogge (1992), Daniele Archibugi (2008), or David Held (2010) emphasize the democratic 
argument that those who are affected by political decisions ought to have a say in them. 
This congruence argument was made prominent in international law by the constitutional 
theorist Hans Kelsen (1925). More recently, both Dahl (1989) and Habermas (1986) consider 
the right of those who are affected to have a say to be the core of the democratic principle. 
In the past, especially in the twentieth century, the democratic nation state made this 
congruence to a considerable extent reality. The nation state provided the shell within which 
the democratic principle could be institutionalized. With globalization, however, the close 
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connection between the nation state and the democratic principle weakened. To the extent 
that the economic and social space of transaction increasingly reaches far beyond national 
borders, both political interventions and the democratic principle need to be globalized as 
well. The international institutions, then, need to be democratized.
As strong as cosmopolitan democratic theory appears to be in its normative principles, 
it is weak in translating these principles into concrete procedures and institutions. First, 
while it is true that many social, economic, and political transactions have effects beyond 
borders, it seems impossible or at least highly arbitrary to set a threshold of how much 
externalities are required before we normatively need to transfer the decision-making 
power to international institutions (threshold issue). Second, even if we were to agree on 
a set of required international institutions, it seems extremely difficult to organize proper 
democratic processes on the global level (feasibility issue).
Given this complexity, the question who is affected by whose decisions is usually too difficult 
to answer in a world of complex, dynamic causalities to form a rational basis for a political 
order. If, for example, the United States of America decides to raise its public debt, it will 
affect almost the rest of the world; if the European Central Bank (ECB) decides to reduce 
interest rates and reflate European economies, it affects the monetary and budgetary 
polices of many other states inside and outside the European Union. If the government 
of China decides to invest in computer technology, it may affect jobs in India or Silicon 
Valley. But such externalities do not automatically grant the right to co-decide on US, EU, or 
Chinese economic policies. 
This raises the question which institutions can legitimately decide who is ‘affected’ across 
borders by a national decision and who the cross-border community of stakeholders is. 
Moreover, how can such an institution making the threshold decisions be legitimated? But 
even if these questions could be resolved, a set of follow-up problems regarding procedural 
issues of decision making arise, which need further thought and empirical research:
• Should the other countries have the same weight in decision making as the country 
that takes the original decision? 
• Which institutions should decide and according to which procedures? Should only the 
executives co-decide? 
• Will the parliament have the right to control the executives? 
• What about the participation of the people in these decisions? 
These are unsolved and practically unsolvable normative and procedural questions that 
show that the “congruence principle” or the determination of the “stakeholders” and their 
representatives cannot easily be translated into procedural practices in international 
policymaking. Transnational stakeholder democracy may be normatively convincing, but 
as long the procedural questions are unresolved and unresolvable, it runs the danger of 
remaining an abstract and utopian vision instead of a realistic political project. 
The supranational extension of democracy entails democratic costs. The larger and the more 
complex the political spaces, the less they are capable of being ruled democratically, as 
Robert Dahl (1989, 213ff.) has argued. Dahl stated: “the international system will lie below 
any reasonable threshold of democracy” (Dahl 1998, 21). Procedures that are central for 
democracy such as the equal participation of citizens, the transparency and predictability of 
political decisions, oversight of the legislatures, or vertical and horizontal checks on power 
can indeed be implemented far less convincingly beyond the nation state than within it. He 
40 Past, Present and Future of Democracy
argues against all cosmopolitan visions: “Just as the rise of the national state reduced the 
capacity of local residents to exercise control over matters of importance to them by means 
of their local governments, so the proliferation of transnational activities and decisions 
reduces the capacity of the citizens of a country to exercise control over matters vitally 
important to them by means of their national government” (Dahl 1989, 319). 
Cosmopolitans doubt that there are necessary conditions for democracy such as ethnic 
and cultural homogeneity, limited size, economic development, or statehood. Indeed, 
they argue that there is no necessary condition in the strict meaning of the term and 
that political communities are socially constructed and change over time. Moreover, the 
idea of national belonging was itself constructed by national elites in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.
Although cosmopolitans do not deny that many of the empirical prerequisites of a 
global democratic polity are not yet fulfilled, they often argue that the most important 
developments in this respect are moving even further away from the model of democratic 
nation states with time.
Cosmopolitans at least implicitly emphasize the liberal elements of democratic decision 
making, i.e., the need for the protection of individual rights, the rule of law, the power of 
the better argument, and so forth. But they ignore that international institutions privilege 
executives over legislatures and thus damage established divisions of power (see Zürn 
2000). In doing so, they seem to favour a version of democracy that discounts the role 
of elections, parties, and parliaments while emphasizing the role of non-majoritarian 
institutions and executives. This implicit understanding of democracy tends to reinforce the 
elitist bias of cosmopolitans.
For many cosmopolitans, the functionalist card of the unavoidability of multilevel decision 
making tends to trump the normative concerns over the loss of democracy anyway. Yet the 
evidence that the decisions of the UN, the IMF, G7, G20, or even the EU tend to be particularly 
efficient and effective remains to be seen. This is not to say that international institutions are 
not effective at all. Their coordination with the IMF and other international agencies during 
the great financial crisis of 2007 and the following years contributed to the containment of 
the negative fallout of the crisis. At the same time, many international institutions do not 
produce strong regulations and member states often fail to implement international rules. 
One clear and very recent example was the refusal of several EU member states to comply 
with the common decision to distribute the refugees across the EU. This refusal was backed 
by the majority of the people of these member states. These are clear warning signs of the 
risks of regional overstretch and of governance beyond the nation state. The worst-case 
scenario would be one in which overstretched regional or supranational regimes display 
undemocratic procedures as well as less efficiency and effectiveness at once. At the very 
least, cosmopolitans have to be aware that not every group of countries or policy field can 
be governed equally effectively and democratically beyond the nation-state. What might 
be true for policy on climate change may not apply to migration or social policy. What may 
function among a rather homogeneous group of countries such as the former EU-15 may 
not work for a heterogeneous Union of 28 or a loose club of powerful states with different 
political regimes and diverging interests such as the G20. This also leads one to question 
the notion of the comparatively homogeneous EU as a model for cosmopolitan governance.
Nevertheless, one can agree with the cosmopolitan argument that the autonomy of single 
states to determine crucial policies is decreasing, albeit more so for the smaller than the 
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larger countries. Too often, however, cosmopolitans interpret this development of the last 
three decades as an iron law and an opportunity to stretch the narrow boundaries in political 
reality and people’s consciousness alike. Moreover, most cosmopolitan theoreticians do not 
tend to think deeply about what of nation-state democracy can and should be salvaged for 
democracy’s sake. They do not think so much about domestic as about global justice and 
democracy. This is indicative of an elitist touch and a lack of attention to the interests and 
anxieties of the less educated and lower-class people within nation states in the West who 
are afraid of borderless governance. In this sense, cosmopolitan theorists may contribute to 
the strengthening of the elite-masses divide and provide fertile discursive ground for RWPs.
2�4 Capitalism as a Challenge to Democracy
Capitalism and democracy had proven themselves the most successful economic and political 
orders by the end of the twentieth century. The spread of democracy in the last quarter of 
the last century was impressive. However, democracy’s success pales in comparison with 
the fulminant expansion of capitalism all over the world. Capitalism has shown that it can 
co-exist with autocratic and democratic regimes from the US to Sweden or Russia and 
China. What pertains for democracy applies for capitalism, too: indeed, we should not use 
the singular, but should speak of a variety of democracies and a variety of capitalisms (inter 
alia Hall and Soskice 2001). We cannot discuss all the different types of capitalism here 
(see Nölke 2013). For the sake of our principal arguments, we can rather refer to a kind 
of average type of capitalism as it has been transformed from a more socially embedded 
welfare capitalism (1945-1970s) to a more dis-embedded form of deregulated financial 
capitalism within the OECD world (inter alia Crouch 2011; Piketty 2013; Streeck 2013; 
Merkel 2018b). Financial capitalism has been blamed for raising socio-economic inequality, 
dismantling the welfare state, empowering global firms, and constraining the capacity of 
states to govern the economy. Not least the latest financial crisis from 2008 onwards and 
the Euro crisis have shaken the firm belief in the complementary nature of capitalism and 
democracy. The question has to be posed: how compatible are the capitalist and democratic 
orders or how deep-seated are the incompatibilities of capitalism and democracy within the 
OECD world (Merkel 2018b)?
2�4�1 Success of Capitalism as a Challenge
Financial capitalism has broken up the peaceful coexistence between democracy and social 
welfare during the first three post-war decades. Since the 1970s, capitalism has transformed 
in a way that has challenged this fruitful coexistence. The turn towards neoliberalism, 
deregulation, and globalization and the rise of financialization have contributed to these 
changes significantly (see inter alia Stiglitz 2002; Harvey 2007; Crouch 2011; Streeck 2013; 
2016; Kocka and Merkel 2015). Taken together, however, they undermined two fundamental 
principles of democracy: first, the democratic core principle that authoritatively binding 
decisions can only be taken by those who are legitimized by constitutional-democratic 
norms; second, the principle of political equality, which has been increasingly eroded by 
the asymmetric distribution of socio-economic resources among citizens, largely to the 
disadvantage of the lower classes. The more economic denationalization progresses and 
the more capitalism breaks free from its social embedding and turns into deregulated 
neo-liberal financial capitalism, the more negative are the effects on the proper working of 
democracy. We will briefly describe four major negative effects.
42 Past, Present and Future of Democracy
1. Increasing socio-economic inequality leads to asymmetric political participation.
Economic inequality translates into social and then rapidly into political inequality. Election 
turnout is declining in Western Europe and quite dramatically so in Eastern Europe (see 
chapter 2.1.3). General national elections in which only 50 per cent (or even less) of the 
electorate participates are highly problematic. Moreover, empirical studies show that the 
vast majority of those who refrain from voting do not engage in other forms of political 
participation either (Przeworski 2010). Bernard Manin (1997, 222ff.) rightfully called this a 
“democracy of spectators”.
The crucial problem democratic theory faces is not the turnout figures as such but the social 
selectivity they imply. The lower the electoral turnout, the higher is the social exclusion. 
Empirical evidence confirms that the lower social classes are the ones who are taking the 
political exit option, while the middle and upper classes are the ones who stay.29 Among 
US citizens, for example, 80 per cent of those with a disposable annual household income 
exceeding USD 100,000 state that they vote, compared to only 33 per cent of those with a 
household income of USD 15,000 or less who state that they vote (Bonica et al. 2013, 111). 
Increasing evidence shows that the American symptoms of lower-class exclusion are ever 
more pertinent within the context of European societies (Schäfer 2015; Weßels 2018). The 
electoral demos is unbalanced: The dominance of the middle classes is increasing and the 
participation of the lower classes constantly decreasing. The lower class increasingly self-
excludes from political participation: “Voting tilts the policy scales in favour of top incomes” 
(Weßels 2018).
The participation-representation gap has increased in almost all OECD countries over the 
past decade. Citizens from the lower classes are participating less in politics than other 
social classes, resulting in negative consequences for the representation of their interests. 
Parliamentary studies show that the preferences of the “lower third” are less represented in 
parliament than those of the “upper third” of society (Lehmann et al. 2018).
2. Elections are increasingly unable to halt growing socio-economic inequalities.
Considering the idea of class-oriented economic voting, it could be argued that most 
voters with an income below the median would vote for political parties that fight for 
redistribution. This would give democracy an instrument to counterbalance severe socio-
economic inequalities. But why has this mechanism failed in the past decades? One of 
the reasons was already mentioned: The lower classes are increasingly staying home on 
election day. Moreover, vote-maximizing parties are tempted to abandon the lower classes 
as potential voters to be won over. Social democratic and other left-wing catch-all parties 
still sometimes claim to represent the interests of those classes in their party programs. 
However, this is often only lip service paid to preserve the party’s “social justice” image 
rather than a genuine attempt to mobilize the politically apathetic and indifferent lower 
classes. Left-wing parties that, when in office, wish to pass policies aimed at improving 
the situation of the lower classes—more education, minimum wages, maintenance of the 
welfare state, taxation of higher incomes to raise public revenues—are confronted with 
threats from investors (Merkel et al. 2008). The main threat from these classes is to move 
capital and investment abroad. The financialization of capitalism and the now easier option 
to move financial capital across national borders has made the democratic state vulnerable. 
29 When asked whether their vote or political participation influence political decision making, more than two-
thirds of lower-class citizens in Germany answer in the negative. When confronted with the same question, more 
than two-thirds of middle-class citizens resoundingly respond in the affirmative, stating that their voice has an 
impact (Merkel and Petring 2012).
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For left-wing parties, this quickly results in a conflict of interest. If investors begin to shift 
investments abroad, this costs jobs and results in lower economic growth, less public 
revenue, less social investment, and ultimately fewer votes. In the context of economic and 
labour-market policies, many social democratic parties have succumbed to the neo-liberal 
globalization discourse of the past two decades. Issues of redistribution have thus lost their 
main advocate in the political arena.
Failed economic voting is not the only explanation for electoral behaviour. Cultural conflicts 
are predetermining voting preferences increasingly during the last two decades. The latter 
can be religious or ethnic in nature. In particular, the lower (middle) classes (mainly men) 
are receptive to authoritarian, xenophobic, and ethnocentric policies (see chapter 2.2.3).
During the first three quarters of the twentieth century, the right to vote became “paper 
stones” for the lower classes (Przeworski 1986). The post-revolutionary working class used 
its suffrage to tame and socially entrench capitalism by electing left-wing (mostly reformist 
social democratic) parties and to successfully establish workers’ rights, a progressive 
tax system, and the expansion of the welfare state. However, this trend halted and even 
reversed in the 1970s.30 In terms of redistribution from the top to the bottom, these paper 
stones have lost their effectiveness and have instead turned into paper tigers. Since the 
1970s, democratic elections have no longer stopped the increase of inequality whereby the 
rich become richer and the poor and lower classes remain stuck in social immobility (inter 
alia Piketty 2013).
3. The state becomes more vulnerable
Project FESSUD makes the point that the finance dominated type of capitalism that has 
developed from the late 1970s and early 1980s on finds its nucleus in the deregulation 
of the national and international financial system and the switch to a shareholder oriented 
corporate governance system. Other aspects such as labour market deregulations 
(including policies to weaken trade unions), the aim of completely free trade around the 
globe, increasing freedom and power of multinational companies, and privatisation of 
formerly state functions also belong to the new regime. The reforms implemented after 
the subprime crisis and the Great Recession are not entirely sufficient to overcome the 
deeply rooted problems of the existing system. Reforms to the financial system did not 
substantially affect the functioning of the shadow banking system and the basic structures 
of the financial system were not changed. Both, the international financial system as well as 
the shareholder oriented corporate governance system were largely spared from reforms. 
Further labour market deregulations are considered by governments and international 
institutions (Herr 2016).
Furthermore, the financialization of capitalism increased the vulnerability of the state to 
banks, hedge funds, global firms, and large investors. In the last two to three decades, it has 
changed capitalism as well as the relationship between capital and the state in all OECD 
countries. Heires and Nölke (2013, 248) define financialization as a process that demands 
the deregulation of financial markets, eliminates national borders, and facilitates the 
introduction of new “financial products” such as derivatives and debt obligations. It brought 
forth the rise of hedge and pension funds as well as other “institutional investors”. The 
ideology of shareholder value has become the primary criterion for investment decisions.
30 In non-Anglo-Saxon countries, this shift did not happen by cutting back the welfare state, but was pushed 
through by a tax and income policy in favor of business and the better-off.
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Financialization has not only increased the dependence of industrial production on the 
financial industry; it has also increased the dependence of the state and of society on 
financial capital. Within governments, financial interests and control have been increasingly 
embedded within institutions and institutionalised structures that are generally conceived 
as imposing financial imperatives and eroding alternative forms of democratic participation 
31 Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the democratic states have emasculated 
themselves by deregulating financial markets step by step, culminating in a set of neo-
liberal market rules, the so-called Washington Consensus (1989). The financial and Euro 
crisis that began in 2008 made the weakened position of state institutions particularly 
visible. Many governments felt obliged to follow the self-help cry of banks that claimed 
to be “too big to fail” (at least in Europe32). The fact that taxpayers were the ones to foot 
the bill is yet further proof of how financial capitalism has become empowered to enforce 
policies on state and society that lead to redistribution from the bottom to the top, both in 
times of economic success and crisis (inter alia Streeck 2013; 2016). 
The combination of an international run on investments, national party competition, and 
neo-liberal economic dogma among those governing has led to a “liberation of the market 
from mass democracy” (Streeck 2013, 77). Should this process not be stopped, capitalism 
and democracy would have to separate eventually (ibid., 235). Deregulating markets 
has put a strain on the compatibility of capitalism and democracy and has made their 
incompatibilities more visible. The gap between capitalism and democracy has become 
larger than during any of the democratic periods in the twentieth century. The state has not 
become a more proactive regulating force despite the fact that the financial sector caused 
the financial crisis. This shows the objective state of helplessness and subjective lack of 
willingness of democratic governments to act in times of financialization. Current Chancellor 
of Germany Angela Merkel highlighted this rather openly (and likely unintentionally) when 
she stated that a “market-conforming democracy” is what we should aim for. Spoken strictly 
from a democratic point of view, the argument would be the reverse: We should not aim for 
“market-conforming democracy” but rather for “democracy-conforming capitalism”. 
Instead of dreaming again about “post-capitalism” (Mason 2015), we should think about 
what a “democracy-conforming capitalism” could look like. To this end, we need further 
theoretical elaboration and comparative empirical research on different experiences with 
different types of capitalism and their varying impacts on democracy.
4. Globalization moves political decision making away from parliament to the executive
The hallmarks of financial capitalism in an age of globalization are the speed, volume, 
complexity, and scope of financial transactions. By contrast, parliaments are always limited 
by their territorial scope and the need for time to prepare, deliberate on, and pass laws. In 
an age of digitalized computer-based financial flows, large-scale financial transactions take 
only a fraction of a second. American political scientist William Scheuerman (2004) speaks 
in general terms of an “empire of speed”. A “desynchronization” of politics and economics, 
of democratic state decisions and private economic transactions has taken place. It would 
be naïve to assume that any political decision could keep pace with the speed of financial 
transactions. Yet both the demos and the global elites implicitly and explicitly demand 
faster political decision making. The most recent example of this has been evident in the 
31 Financialization, Economy Society and Sustainable Development: An Overview. FESSUD Working Paper Series 
No206.
32 The US government followed the capitalist rules of a free market more closely when it allowed many more 
banks to go bankrupt then did European governments.
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political discourse and actions of European governments since 2008. The demand for faster 
political decision making illustrates a particular democratic paradox in times of crisis: Far-
reaching crisis decisions often have considerable welfare and redistributive consequences. 
For this reason, these decisions in particular require reliable democratic input legitimacy 
(Enderlein 2013, 720, 733; Kneip and Merkel 2018). However, the objective or assumed time 
constraints typically result in technocratic-executive decision making with thin democratic 
input legitimacy. 
2�4�2 Failure of Capitalism as a Challenge 
The neo-Marxist literature on the crisis of “late capitalism” and the “democratic state” 
from the early 1970s (inter alia Offe 1972; Habermas 1973; O’Connor 1973) considered 
economic crises to be the trigger for crises of democracy that can lead to a crisis of the 
fiscal state, create structural problems for the democratic-administrative apparatus, or 
lead to disastrous legitimacy crises of the economic, political, and social system. The most 
recent and radical position can be found in the work of Paul Mason, who sees from an 
almost classical Marxian perspective the final collapse of capitalism and provides in his 
book “Postcapitalism” already “a guide to our future” (2015). More scientific in his analysis, 
but certainly not less radical in his conclusion is Wolfgang Streeck (2016, 13), who sees 
unstoppable endogenous forces of self-destruction at work in present-day capitalism. He 
speaks of a “demise of post-war-democracy standards” (ibid., 21). 
Not denying the lucid insights into some of the problematic dynamics of capitalism, Streeck 
overstress his critique and speaks of a general crisis of capitalism and democracy. His 
prediction of the self-destruction of capitalism cannot be easily sustained (and the same 
applies to his diagnosis that democracy has degenerated into a mere façade). Neither the 
post-capitalist thesis nor the post-democracy theorem can be supported by more rigorous 
empirical research (see Introduction). In order to understand the challenge of capitalism for 
democracy better, we should turn the post-capitalist hypothesis on its head. The principal 
(counter-)argument as explicated above, therefore, is that it is not the crisis of capitalism, 
but the triumph of a specific, namely financialized neo-liberal version of capitalism that has 
increasingly created challenges to democracy. These challenges have not been resolved so 
far and may not even be solvable at all. This, in turn, means that democracy has to live with 
significant challenges and tensions generated by financialized capitalism and has to look for 
a political solution that does not destroy the growth-stimulating dynamics of capitalism but 
does re-embed the capitalist economy into a framework of social and political principles 
that make it more compatible with the fundamental principles and procedures of democracy 
(Merkel 2014a).
This is not to deny that economic crises such as the great financial recession of 2008 
onwards and the Euro crisis created (different) problems for democracy in various EU member 
states. Recent EU funded projects have attempted to shed led light on the impacts of the 
great financial crisis of 2008. Projects EUENGAGE, BEUCITIZEN, RECRIRE, and REINVEST 
confirm the hyperfinancialization of modern capitalism and the loss of trust among citizens 
in the market economy. After 2008, no democracy broke down, while the affected OECD 
countries and international organizations such as the IMF succeeded in economic-political 
coordination to avoid domino effects and to support those countries or banks that found 
themselves in severe trouble. 
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EUENGAGE finds that the Euro and migration crises resulted in a new political cleavage. 
At the same time, EU funded projects demonstrate that there is a growing polarisation 
between European voters as a result of the crisis. On the one hand, there are citizens 
who feel close to a particular party, follow elite cues and are generally more supportive 
of European integration. On the other hand, there are citizens who do not feel close to a 
political party and are more apathetic and Eurosceptic. The predominantly pro-European 
discourse and behaviour of mainstream parties risks alienating these citizens even more 
(Stoeckel and Kuhn 2017).
Furthermore, projects highlight that citizens’ vote for Eurosceptic parties of the left seems to 
aim at a revision of the present framework of the EU, namely the polity dimension but also 
the prevailing economic policies. In contrast to that support for conservative Eurosceptic 
parties seems to be motivated by more far-reaching consequences for the future of the 
Union since it involves the entire spectrum of issues – immigration as well as economic. 
Finally, mainstream parties were also forced to articulate a more negative tone towards the 
European project as a result of wider trends (Braun et al. 2017).
Project ENLIGHTEN finds that public trust in national and EU political institutions has been 
falling together with support for European integration. This has led to increasingly volatile 
national politics with the electoral cycling of incumbent governments and the growth of 
populism. Such toxic politics are the result of the poor economic performance of the EU and 
in particular the Eurozone in the previous years (Schmidt 2016).
Project bEUcitizen demonstrates that financial pressures translated into effective constraints 
on the meaningful exercise of the right to vote, the right to participation and the right 
to information. The project concludes that the euro crisis posed no threat to the formal 
validity of core citizenship rights. However, it shows (at least in Austria, Slovakia, Ireland and 
Finland) the limitation of viable political alternatives in electoral competition, the influential 
role of executive actors and bureaucratic transnational European elites as well as secrecy 
practices and in some cases the lack of appropriate accountability structures restricted the 
meaningful exercise of European political citizenship and democracy.33 
The Euro crisis had negative effects particularly on the so-called net recipient countries of 
the EU, above all in the European South, in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus (Scharpf 
2013; 2015; 2017; Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2018. See also project IMPROVE for the social 
impact and inequality trends):
• The so-called Troika (IMF, EU Commission, European Central Bank (ECB)) deeply 
intervened into the capacity of the nation states to determine their own fiscal policy. 
Externally imposed austerity and economic technocracy substituted democratic 
policymaking by the elected authorities. The governments felt forced to be more 
responsive to their loan providers than to their own citizenry.
• The external interventions tilted the power balance even more heavily in favour of the 
executive. The parliaments often only served as ex post rubber stamp institutions.
• The proposed austerity measures increased the socio-economic and therefore indirectly 
the political inequality within the affected societies (Project IMPROVE. See also chapter 
2.1.3).
33 bEUcitizen D8.5 Democratic parliamentary control in times of crisis; Constraints imposed by financial mar-
kets on political choice in the EU (D8.1)
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• The construction of the Euro and its members as a collection of economically very 
heterogeneous countries forces those countries with less competiveness into a 
permanent retrenchment of the welfare state and low wages; both factors lead to a 
regressive redistribution in society (Scharpf 2015, 15).
• Majoritarian decision making whereby a majority of member states decides against a 
minority of other states on policies that deeply interfere in the latter’s internal affairs 
is highly problematic from a democratic point of view. For heterogeneous societies, 
consensual policymaking is the most democratic mode of political decisions (Lijphart 
1999). This applies very much to the EU with its enormous economic, social, and cultural 
heterogeneity. It also applies to the situation of the Euro crisis where a small group of 
Northern countries under the leadership of Germany decided on fiscal measures within 
the heavily indebted countries of the South. Fritz W. Scharpf formulates this democratic 
problem very pithily: “The German voters and the German Bundestag cannot legitimize 
the German chancellor and its minister of finance to impose severe burdens on the 
citizens of Portugal” (Scharpf 2017, 282; translated by WM). Since these austerity 
measures continue to be imposed on the debtor countries for a long period of time, 
such measures cannot even be legitimated as emergency measures (ibid.). The hopes 
of Jürgen Habermas and other pro-EU democrats that the Euro crisis would open up 
possibilities for further democracy within the Union have not been fulfilled thus far.
• The competing political parties of the debtor countries, from the right to the left, did 
not offer significantly different programs with respect to fiscal policy in their countries, 
at least until anti-austerity challenger parties such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in 
Spain. But when they came into government such as Syriza did, they had basically to 
follow the external doctrines of austerity programs. The voters vote, but seem to have 
only little or no choice (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2018, 198). However, policy “choice” is 
an important matter in pluralist democracies and is indeed perceived as such by the 
large majority of the citizens (ibid., 203). The two authors conclude: “When citizens 
observe that democracy is a system in which parties lose elections but winners are 
unwilling or unable to implement alternative policies …, the satisfaction with democracy 
decreases” (ibid., 220).
• Politics without choice often leads to lower trust of the citizens in their governments, 
political elites, and even democracy as a whole. Armingeon et al. (2016) argue that 
citizens care about democratic choice and perceived it as largely absent in the net 
recipient countries during the Euro crisis. However, there are other authors (Scharpf 
1999) who observe a tendency in present-day democracies whereby people are more 
interested in the delivery of economic welfare (“output”) than correct democratic 
decision making (“throughput”) or strong citizen participation (“input”).
There are much fewer negative consequences for the so-called net donor countries within 
the Eurozone. Nevertheless, there are also a few worth mentioning here:
• Disempowerment of parliaments. Democratic politics and deliberative decision making 
in the parliament has been accused of being too slow. The German chancellor put 
pressure on the parliamentarians to decide within one week on matters that most 
of them did not understand. The blackmailing argument of the executive against the 
legislature was: If you do not pass the Euro bailout bill, the financial markets may 
face turbulence. Democracy, in other words, has to conform to the markets rather 
than the other way around. Angela Merkel and other governing elites of the Eurozone 
located states “in markets, rather than markets in states” (Streeck 2016, 22). “Global 
governance” is now seen by many executive elites and scholars of International 
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Relations as the appropriate form to govern in the age of globalization. The expectation 
is that “coercive states” have disappeared and have been substituted by a “voluntaristic 
civil society … international organizations and epistemic communities” (ibid., 23).
To Summarize
Financial capitalism turned out to be harmful for democracy. As project FESSUD shows 
the financialisation of the economy has posed problems to the social and political 
“embeddedness” of democracies, increased socio-economic inequality, and freed markets 
from sociopolitical regulation by democratically elected governments. This does not mean 
that capitalism is incompatible with democracy per se. A sustainable coexistence of 
capitalism and democracy is best achieved through mutual embedding. The existence of the 
right to private property and functioning markets are vital restrictions on the centralization 
of political power in democratic regimes. Nevertheless, there has to be a balance of power 
between markets and democratic governments in economic matters as well. This balance 
has given way to a pro-market bias that is exploited not least by huge global firms that 
interfere in the autonomous fiscal competencies of nation states. Ireland and Google is only 
one of the most visible examples.
Representative democracy has not found effective antidotes against the disease of socio-
economic and political inequality and the loss of steering power of national governments 
and even EU organs. All countermeasures discussed in democratic theory—from referenda 
to deliberative assemblies, monitoring (Keane 2011), or counter-democracy (Rosanvallon 
2008)—may save whales, help control government, and improve certain spheres of local 
democracy, but have little relevance for reregulating markets, restoring social welfare, 
and halting progressing inequality (see chapter 2.6). The “cultural turn” of progressive 
democratic politics has forgotten the problem of regulating capitalism and now stands 
empty-handed, without a cure for democracy’s most obvious disease: inequality.
Is capitalism compatible with democracy? It depends. It depends on the type of capitalism 
and on the type of democracy. If one insists that democracy is more than the minimalist 
concept proposed by Joseph Schumpeter and takes the imperative of political equality 
seriously, the present form of financialized “disembedded capitalism” poses considerable 
challenges to democracy. If these challenges are not met with democratic and economic 
reforms, democracy may slowly transform into an oligarchy, formally legitimized by general 
elections, but heavily dominated by economic interests of powerful global investors. 
Needs for Further Research
• The economic crises during the last decade have strengthened the hypothesis that 
citizens are already content if governments deliver and not least solve fundamental 
economic problems. We need more empirical research across space (countries) and 
time whether citizens are increasingly inclined (or not) to prefer output performance 
at the cost of input and throughput performance. If this is the case, a strong tendency 
towards technocratic governance could prevail in the future.
• The result would be the return to an “audience democracy”, which Bernard Manin 
has described for the transition from “mass democracy” to a democracy where the 
citizens have become spectators without powerful collective actors. (Manin 1997). This 
would be in itself a problematic development. It could be even further exacerbated 
if and when right-wing populists mobilize against “corrupt elites”, “technocracy”, and 
established organizations and institutions of representative democracy.
• We need more comparative research on the role of parliaments in general and during 
49Policy Review
the financial and Euro crisis in particular. We lack good empirical research on the often 
anecdotally assumed loss of power of parliaments vis-à-vis markets, executives, and 
supranational regimes. Only if we can map those lost competencies and gain insights 
into their causes can we think about antidotes and reform measures.
• Socio-economic inequality has risen. However, the degree differs from country to 
country among the OECD or EU countries. We need more systematic knowledge about 
the causes of those differences as well as to what extent it depends on the type of 
market (de-)regulation and on specific welfare measures. The rule of thumb the higher 
the degree of market regulation and the bigger the welfare state does not suffice for 
finding out what are the driving forces of inequality and which political measures can 
reduce socio-economic and therefore also political inequality.
2�5 Direct Democracy and Democratic Innovations
Whenever the principal institutions and procedures of representative democracy lose 
esteem and acceptance among the citizens, the call for more direct democracy grows 
and becomes ubiquitous. Disappointed citizens want to decide directly on concrete issues 
rather than leaving it to the representatives alone. Beyond the old democratic instrument 
of referenda, there are many different forms of so-called “democratic innovations” that 
intend to enhance citizens’ involvement in a more direct participation in decision making. 
They cannot all be discussed here. Nevertheless, three forms of direct democracy will be 
exemplarily presented here (see also Merkel and Pogrebinschi 2018):
• Referenda
• Deliberative Democracy
• Digital Democracy
These three models of participation each rely on a different means through which citizens 
and civil society organizations can engage with and within the political process. 
1. Referenda are direct means for citizens to decide on concrete political issues and 
determine specific policies. In modern times, it is widely used in Switzerland (since 1848 on 
the federal level), California, Italy, and to lesser extents in many other countries or regions. 
Among all the forms of direct democratic decision making, it is still the most relevant and 
powerful instrument for directly determining political decisions.
2. Deliberation: Many of the new forms of participation are based on deliberation among 
citizens themselves or among citizens and state officials. Deliberation encompasses all 
forms of interaction in which citizens have the chance to voice their positions and hear the 
positions of other participants (e.g., Citizen assemblies, town hall meetings, Mini-Publics). 
Deliberation is about voicing opinions or demands, but particularly requires discursive 
interaction and exchange. Deliberative forms of communicative exchange enable the 
transformation of positions and preferences of the participants based on rational argument 
and the “forceless force of the better argument” as the philosopher Jürgen Habermas once 
put it. 
Examples of institutional deliberative designs include several forms of so-called mini-
publics, but also policy councils, participatory budgeting, participatory planning, deliberative 
pools, and multilevel policymaking. 
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3. Digital Participation: Digital tools of information and communication have given rise to 
a new model of participation. Computers and tablets with access to the internet as well as 
mobile devices such as cell phones reduce individual transaction costs (time) for participation. 
New forms of application software and programs have been increasingly designed to allow 
citizens to play a role in different stages of the policy process, such as agenda-setting, 
policy formulation, policy implementation, and evaluation/monitoring. Institutional designs 
that involve digital participation include inter alia crowdsourcing legislation, collaborative 
administration, e-government, and interactive policy platforms.
If we want to evaluate the democratic surplus value (or democratic problems) of these 
new instruments, the following questions have to be answered: which improvements 
can we expect if we introduce more direct democratic measures in our predominantly 
representative democracies? Which of the current malaises of representative democracy 
can be cured in terms of participation, representation, and policy outcomes? Are these 
forms of direct democracy complementary to representative government and strengthen 
liberal democracy or do they substitute and crowd out reliable procedures of representation 
and weaken liberal democracy as a working system?
2�5�1 Referenda
Most citizens do not consider direct democratic procedures such as referenda to be in 
contradiction to representative democracy. Rather, they tend to opt for a combination 
of direct democratic instruments and representative procedures as the most desirable 
institutional setup because it can enhance their opportunities to meaningfully participate 
in political affairs. I see four relevant criteria that can determinate whether the legitimate 
claim for (more) referenda by the citizens also corresponds to a legitimate procedure of 
democratic decision making: the voter turnout, the sociostructural representativeness of 
the voters, the character of the referenda campaigns, the reasonability of the decisions, and 
their compatibility with the normative principles of liberal democracy. 
Turnout
There is a majority of citizens in EU member states in favour of more opportunities for 
referenda. Political elites in democracies have to respond to the growing demand of the 
citizens. But does the growing demand as it is shown in surveys mean that the majority 
of those citizens will actually take part in referenda? If we consider the turnout criterion 
on national referenda, some scepticism vis-à-vis the high-flying expectations seems to be 
appropriate. In almost all Western and Eastern European countries, the turnout in national 
referenda lags behind the voter turnout in national parliamentary elections (Merkel and Ritzi 
2017, 25ff.). The difference is already evident in Western Europe, but particularly significant 
in Eastern Europe, as Figure 14 shows. The more frequently referenda are held, the lower 
the turnout tends to be, as the examples of Switzerland, Italy, and Ireland suggest.
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Figure 13: Voter turnout in national referenda and national parliamentary 
elections (selected OECD countries)
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Figure 14: Voter turnout in national referenda and national parliamentary 
elections in Eastern Europe
The general argument must be clear: If the voter turnout in referenda is systematically 
lower than in parliamentary elections, the democratic legitimacy of these referenda is 
questionable. Therefore, a high turnout and reasonable high compulsory quorums for 
participation are important criteria for determining whether direct democratic measures 
such as referenda can indeed democratize democracy. The turnout should be similar or close 
to the turnout of parliamentary elections insofar as the referenda are not complementary 
but substitutive to parliamentary decision making.
Campaigns
The democratic character of referenda is also determined by the question who dominates 
the campaign of a referendum. The more these campaigns are influenced by the civil society 
from below, the more we can consider them to be a democratic complement to representative 
government. This does not mean that referenda are illegitimate when the established actors 
of the political society such as political parties dominate the campaigns, but it severely 
limits their character as democratic complements to representative democracy. However, 
empirical evidence across several countries shows (Kriesi 2005; 2007, 92; Hornig 2011; 
Merkel and Ritzi 2017) that, in particular, political elites (government, opposition), parties, 
interest groups, and to a lesser degree NGOs (especially in local referenda) dominate these 
campaigns. In California, well-organized interest groups are very active and often tend to 
capture referenda for private economic interests. This is not the case in Europe, where 
political parties are the dominant actors (Kriesi 2007) and where the coalition of political 
parties that support or initiate a specific referendum are the best predictors for the outcome. 
The stronger the parties within a political system (“partyness of a society”), the more they 
also dominate referenda (Hornig 2011). In such cases, referenda are only rarely correctives 
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to representative government, but they at least present a forum for public debates and 
strengthen the citizens’ sense of belonging to the democratic community. Moreover, they 
signal specific policy preferences of the citizens to the representative institutions such as 
political parties and the parliament.
Patterns of Results
How compatible is the substance of the results of referenda with the normative underpinnings 
of liberal democracy? Supporters of referenda sometimes argue that referenda can serve 
to lift reform blockades within the set structure of the representative system. This was the 
case in 1974 and 1981 in Italy when an absolute majority of voters blocked conservatives 
who wanted to abrogate the new laws legalizing divorce and abortions in a referendum. It 
is just as conceivable, however, that referenda can be used to defend the status quo, as was 
the case with the infamous Proposition 8 in California or a similar referendum in Croatia in 
2013, both of which enshrined an exclusively heterosexual definition of marriage into the 
constitution. 
If one looks to the decision outcomes of referenda with regard to fiscal policy, social 
policy, and minority questions, there are certain patterns observable at least as far as the 
experiences of “referendum democracy” in Switzerland and California tell us. Whenever 
questions of taxation and public expenditures are involved, the results of referenda tend to 
lower taxes and expenditures. This is also one reason why neo-classical political economists 
in Switzerland and elsewhere are among the most enthusiastic supporters of referenda 
(inter alia Frey 1994; Feld and Kirchgässner 2000). All three economists also found that 
those cantons in Switzerland that decide on fiscal matters by referenda display lower public 
debts than those where the parliament is responsible for fiscal policy. 
There is a similar pattern observable if one looks at social policy (Obinger 1998; Wagschal 
and Obinger 2000). According to the two welfare state researchers who looked at the 
relation between the development of the welfare state and referenda in Switzerland from 
1848 up to 1999, referenda had an limiting effect on social welfare policies in three different 
regards: they limited the volume of social expenditures, they exerted a retarding effect on 
the institutionalization of the welfare state, and they had a structurally conserving impact 
on the social status quo. However, they also argued that once the social welfare state has 
reached a certain degree of institutionalization, referenda tend to function as a procedural 
bulwark against the retrenchment of the welfare state, i.e., they preserve the status quo. 
While the results of referenda in fiscal and social policy may be judged differently according 
to the normative standpoint of economists and welfare state researchers, the impact on 
the quality of democracy has to be regarded as neutral. This is not the case when we look 
at the third policy field, namely the impact on the rights and protections of ethnic and other 
minorities. There are not firm patterns recognizable, but systematic studies for Switzerland 
(Helbling and Kriesi 2004) and California (Bowler and Donovan 2001) show certain trends 
towards illiberalism. Especially as Right-wing Populist parties have discovered referenda 
as a promising instrument for illiberalizing our democracies and stopping further European 
integration. Legislators have to carefully distinguish between those issues that are suitable 
for further referenda in order to democratize our democracies and those that are not. In any 
case, the fundamental rights of minorities do not seem to be appropriate issues to be dealt 
with in referenda, which are majoritarian democratic instruments par excellence. 
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Referenda and European Integration
If we look to national referenda concerning matters of the European Union, the voter 
turnout grows significantly. This speaks favourably for these referenda, particularly as the 
voter turnout for the European Parliament remains very low (43% in 2009 and 2014). In 
terms of turnout, referenda on EU membership and changes to the EU treaties enjoy a high 
democratic legitimacy within the member states. However, there is a fear that referenda can 
be used by anti-European forces such as the growing RWPs against European integration. 
Very recent European research on these matters (e.g., bEUcitizen34) discusses the 
possibilities of denationalizing EU-wide referenda. The researchers argue that current 
practices of referenda on EU issues in the member states can produce distortions in 
democratic functioning due to the ad hoc way in which the referenda are held. Firstly, 
optional referenda mean that the incumbent government calls for a referendum only on 
issues on which it can expect to receive strong support. As such, optional government-
induced referenda are used as strategic instruments, i.e., as plebiscites and not democratic 
measures. Secondly, optional referenda allow some member states to have stronger 
negotiation power than others, especially when the referenda are not held simultaneously. 
Thirdly, optional referenda produce discrimination among EU citizens since only a few of 
them are given the right to participate. Therefore, the study by bEUcitizen (Deliverable 
8.7) proposes a model for a European referendum that is: (1) held on EU-internal issues 
of primary law; (2) mandatory; (3) simultaneous in all member states; (4) binding; and (5) 
simple regarding subject matter.
The same research shows that a majority of citizens in Europe would be willing to vote in 
such EU referenda. Moreover, statistical analysis shows that Europeans who are more likely 
to vote in an EU referendum exhibit stronger support for the European Union. Giving the vote 
to EU citizens in referenda, therefore, would not necessarily block the integration process, 
at least not in a medium to long-term perspective. Nevertheless, it is very doubtful whether 
this dynamic will continue when RWPs strongly mobilize against European integration.
However, there is insufficient evidence supporting the fundamental critiques of direct 
democracy at the European level. On the one hand, the objections bring to light general 
problems of democracy that will neither disappear nor subside by refraining from direct 
democracy altogether, but need to be addressed by legal instruments that apply in direct and 
representative democracies. On the other hand, both the objections and the related empirical 
research highlight that direct democracy needs to be in a complementary relationship with 
representative democracy and should be integrated within robust constitutional conditions 
that guarantee fundamental rights and the principle of subsidiarity.
2�5�2 Deliberative Democracy
Referenda are sharp majoritarian swords in political decision making. The different forms 
of deliberative democracy follow an opposite logic. The basic idea is that of a procedure 
that creates an discursive environment for small groups that is conducive to providing the 
participants with solid information about a controversial political issue (e.g., electoral reform 
(British Columbia 2005 and 2009), abortion (Ireland), migration) and organizing a discussion 
where rational argument is the standard and everybody has an equal chance to participate. 
34 Report on options for direct democracy in the EU (bEUcitizen Deliverable 8.7). Also Policy Brief 2016L: To-
wards a more legitimate form of direct democracy in the EU. Policy scenarios and recommendations from bEUci-
tizen, a research project on the barriers to realise and exercise citizenship rights by European Union citizens.
55Policy Review
All this is grounded in an elaborate theory of rational non-distorted discourses and a “Theory 
of Communicative Action” (Habermas 1984 [1981]) developed by the German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas. The groups or small assemblies are to be freed from particular interests, 
power, and rhetorical dominance. A trained facilitator chairs these meetings and sees to it 
that the (ideal) conditions of communicative discourse and action prevail. The claim is that 
the “forceless force of the better argument” should bring the participants to well-informed 
rational positions which are fair and conducive for community-building. This is certainly a 
quite simplified abstract of a complex theory (for the theory, see inter alia Dryzek 1990; 
2000; Fishkin 1991; 1997; Goodin 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 2004).
But deliberative praxis as we know it certainly shows some distance from theory and 
focuses mainly on information, rational argument, and equal access to discourse. With the 
so-called “systemic turn” (Dryzek 2010; Mansbridge and Parkinson 2012), the theory of 
deliberation was supposed to be transformed into a concept that can be applied in political 
reality. Political reality means that real assemblies and groups can be randomly sampled 
or selected on a certain representative basis and entrusted with the authority to consult, 
advise, and co-decide in political affairs. Beyond those “real groups,” there is an experimental 
branch of deliberation that can be subsumed under the headline “deliberative polling” (see 
inter alia EUROPOLIS Activity 8.5., Deliverable 16). These are experiments where small 
groups of (EU) citizens are sampled around a specific topic and discuss it in a deliberative 
setting for a few days. One major result is that people often change their opinions after 
an intensive discourse. The social scientists who organize these meetings ascribe such 
changes in opinion to the better information and the deliberative exchange of opinions and 
arguments. According to Irena Fiket, Espen D. H. Olsen, and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2011, 24) 
(EUROPOLIS Project): “… the EuroPolis experiment proves that citizens are in principle able 
to interact and debate across languages and cultures, thereby turning a heterogeneous 
group of randomly chosen participants into a nascent constituency of democracy.” The 
wider claim of most deliberative theorists and practitioners is that if society can provide 
many deliberative “mini-publics,” these will contribute to creating rational, well-informed, 
and fair decisions.35 
Democratic Gains
Deliberative democracy or—more pragmatically—democratic deliberation promises, 
above all, democratic gains on the output side. Deliberative procedures are supposed to 
produce more rational, reasonable, and fair output (decisions) and strengthen the common 
sense of belonging to a political community (macro level). This reflects the traditions of 
Enlightenment thought from Kant to Habermas. On the micro level of individual opinions, 
most deliberative experimentalists emphasize the change of individual preferences in 
favour of rationality and fairness. The driving force of “better” decisions are more qualified 
information and the deliberative setting of common reasoning and debate. To what extent 
such a communitarian change of preferences finds its difficult way from the experimental 
micro-environment towards the relevant political macro level of the democratic system is a 
troublesome question that has yet to be answered satisfactorily by all the “deliberationists”.
This is not to say that there were no valuable attempts to implement the idea in practice. 
John Dryzek, for example (1990; 2000), proposed so-called Mini-Publics and watered 
down the demanding rationality of democratic deliberation beyond particular interests and 
35 It should be already noted here that this claim by most of the deliberative theorists and activists is often 
challenged by other democratic theorists of different provenance such as Pluralists, post-Marxists, or Liberals 
(see below).
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domination. He even accepts rhetoric and negotiation and prefers to talk about “discursive” 
instead of “deliberative” democracy (Dryzek 2011, 101). Moreover, Dryzek moves the 
deliberative focus from rational and fair outputs to the input dimension of emancipatory 
participation of civil society activities. He thereby consciously relies on Tocqueville’s 
legacy of “civic associations,” which he sees as successfully substituted by discursive fora, 
citizen assemblies, and new social movements in modern times. However, Gutmann and 
Thompson (1994) consider civil society activities more as preconditions than results of 
deliberative discourses. According to both authors, the preconditions can best be generated 
by a functioning tax- and welfare state, which places particular emphasis on the excellent 
education of the citizens. Respectful communication, acceptable arguments, negotiation, 
and compromises characterize the “pragmatic turn” of democratic deliberation away from 
the pure ideals of “communicative action” (Habermas 1984 [1981]).
Democratic Problems
The aforementioned democratic gains must be confronted with a series of democratic 
problems that have yet to be solved. Adam Przeworski, an eminent scholar of democracy 
and a rational-choice political theorist, points to a supposedly logical inconsistency of the 
deliberative setting. If, so goes his argument, all participants have equal information and 
equal chances to participate, then deliberative processes should not change convictions 
(Przeworski 1998, 145). If they do so nonetheless, there might be two problematic 
causes behind it: (a) the participants do not, in fact, have equal access to information or 
(b) they do not have the same cognitive capacity to deliberate (ibid.). Przeworski doubts 
that deliberative rules and communication alone are able to produce reason and truth 
in a societal environment characterized by unequal political power and an asymmetrical 
distribution of economic and cognitive resources. Jane Mansbridge (1980), currently one of 
the most eminent protagonists of the pragmatic turn of democratic deliberation, confirmed 
Przeworski’s doubts in an early study in 1980. Her empirical research of town hall meetings 
in New England showed that these real (not experimental) publics could never fully avoid 
the asymmetries of power, economic resources, cognitive competencies, social status, 
gender, and social networks.
Pluralist democratic theorists such as Ian Shapiro (2003) are very critical of some of the 
normative presumptions of deliberative democracy. They argue that instead of rejecting 
particular interests from deliberative discourses, openly acknowledging and negotiating 
different conflicts of interests constitutes the procedural fabric of open and pluralist 
societies. Differences of interest and normative conviction are simply too big in society for 
finding “the” common good by collective deliberation only. This is quite obvious if one looks 
at tax, social, and economic policies, but also if one considers value-loaded questions such 
as abortion or gay marriage. Chantal Mouffe (inter alia 2000; 2005) argues even more 
critically against the Habermasian idea of consensus-based democratic deliberation. For 
her, “conflict” is the essence of the political. Against deliberative “depoliticisation,” she calls 
for an “agonistic”36 processing of “antagonist conflicts” that are ineradicably immanent to 
modern capitalist societies.
An additional problem of deliberative democracy seems to be built into the somehow 
heroic assumption that unequal cognitive resources can be equalized by information and 
facilitation. The suspicion arises that relatively brief introductions to complex issues such as 
36 “Agonistic” means emphasizing antagonistic conflicts in society and politics, but finding procedures that allow 
for dealing with these conflicts within the normative boundaries of democracy.
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climate change, the working of financial markets, pension formulas, or labour markets are 
not sufficient means to equalize unequal information and discursive capabilities between 
a professional economist and a supermarket cashier. If the issues are less complex, such 
as the construction of streets, roads, parking slots, and airports, the information problem 
can more easily be solved. On the other hand, deliberative democratic procedures would 
then be relevant mostly for less important issues of low politics. In any case, we have to 
make clearer which political issues are suitable for democratic deliberation and under which 
circumstances deliberative assemblies should have consultative competencies or even the 
authority to make binding decisions for the respective community. In order to meet the 
demanding criteria of democratic legitimacy, consultative functions should be combined 
with genuinely democratic procedures such as referenda or parliamentary decision making.
An additional democratic problem concerns the role and the selection of the facilitators. 
The old question arises: who guards against the guardians? Facilitators have an eminent 
focal position. They supervise the discussion and may also be influential in selecting the 
experts for supplying unbiased information about the political question involved. If these 
deliberative mini-publics are to be implemented on a large scale, then commonly agreed 
rules have to be drawn up concerning who selects the facilitators and experts and who 
supervises them. If democracy is – beyond freedom and equality – also about how to 
control those who have power, facilitators must be controlled as well by democratically 
legitimated bodies. Up to now, there are no convincing solutions proposed to solve this key 
democratic question.
Conclusion
Democratic theories have to pass a double test: they have to observe the logical laws of 
internal consistency on the one hand and be relevant in political reality on the other. If they 
do not pass the first criterion, we should not speak of a democratic theory. If they do not 
stand the test of political relevance, they run the risk of remaining “Glasperlenspiele” for 
purely academic debates. Deliberative theory is highly consistent in Habermas’s writings 
on “Communicative Action” (1984 [1981]) and “Between Facts and Norms” (1996). But his 
theory cannot easily be translated or even tried out in political reality. This is one reason 
why there are many more books about experimental “deliberative polling” than about real 
deliberative assemblies. The pragmatic turn in democratic deliberation has reduced the 
demanding normative requirements and made different forms of deliberative democracy 
more applicable to political reality. As yet, however, bottom-up deliberative democracy 
does not play a major role in real political participation and decision making. This does not 
disqualify the deliberative idea of democracy as such and its possibly positive complementary 
effects on representative democracy. However, we have to accept the empirical fact that 
democratic deliberation has not been implemented forcefully into democratic practice 
within the democratic OECD world thus far. We do not deny its democratic potential, but it 
has yet to be powerfully materialized.
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2�5�3 Digitalization of Democracy
Digitalization is fundamentally changing our societies, as the Industrial Revolution once did. 
It changes our daily communication, modes of production, work, and financial transactions. 
It has already started to change specific spheres of democracy and democracy as a 
whole. We are witnessing a “digital” or computational turn (Berry 2011). Although there 
is a growing bulk of dispersed (not always high-quality) literature, we do not sufficiently 
understand the specific impact digitalization has, can, and will have on the working of 
democracy. The theoretical quality and reflexivity of writings about e-democracy is far 
from the sophisticated and epistemic quality of traditional theories of democracy. At times, 
it is a case of “technological innovations simply searching for new areas of application” 
(Schaal 2016, 300). Specialists on digitalization do not know very much about democratic 
theory, while democratic theorists often remain largely ignorant about the sophisticated 
democratic mechanisms of digitalization. Since there is a strong need for theoretically 
informed empirical research about the risks and opportunities for democracy in the present 
and future, we need more research cooperation between cyber- and political scientists. 
It will help us to understand better how and which forms of digitalization will impact 
on which institutions, procedures, and collective actors of the political system and what 
consequences they will have on the future of democracy. Finally, we need more insights on 
how digitalization influences the political behaviour of citizens.
There is no authoritative definition of cyber or e-democracy37. However, Päivärinta and 
Øystein (2006, 818) presented already twelve years ago a definition that is parsimonious, 
encompassing, and consensus-friendly: “E-democracy refers to the use of information 
and communication technology (ICT) in political debates and decision making processes, 
complementing or contrasting traditional means of communication” (Päivärinta and Øystein 
(2006, 818, cited in Schaal 2016). Since the discussion began at the beginning of the 
1990s, we can distinguish between three phases of discourses about cyber democracy, 
which can be briefly described as first optimism, then realism, and at present a visible 
tendency towards scepticism.
The literature in the first phase from 1990 to the mid-1990s was characterized by an 
optimistic utopian vision of cyber democracy. The Internet was seen as a universal space 
for communication, participation, and deliberation. The grand promise was that the confines 
between communication, participation, representation, and decision making will disappear; 
space and time will lose their limiting character and the enlightened digital citizen will be 
able to switch between these four dimensions of politics according to his or her needs. The 
digital utopians expected that most of the democratic procedures and processes will be 
transferred from the off-line world to the online cyberspace. More libertarian observers hoped 
that the citizens would take over genuine functions from the representative democratic 
state. The communitarians among the cyber utopians hoped for a bottom-up participatory 
revolution and a political community that can be local, national, or transnational (Schaal 
2016, 283). Nevertheless, some more critical voices already warned that such communities 
can be fluid and fictional (Rheingold 1993).
By the end of the 1990s, the grand utopian visions of cyber democracy had disappeared. 
The focus was now directed to concrete forms of digital participation at the local and 
sometimes at the national level. A series of different digital instruments were developed 
37 We are using the two terms here as synonyms.
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to invite citizens to express their opinion or even to become involved in debating concrete 
laws and policies. Crowd legislation tried to draw citizens into the arena of meaningful 
participation and thereby allow them to have a real impact on material political decisions. 
The vision projected a second-order democracy, where the citizens do not only monitor their 
representatives but also participate in concrete policy formation.
In the third phase, the realistic experimentalism seeking to improve the intermediation 
between represented and representatives has not disappeared. But it is now accompanied 
by a still ongoing pessimistic trend that, in particular, emphasizes the risks of the Internet 
for democracy. The US political scientist Rogers Brubaker speaks in this vein of a “crisis 
of public knowledge” (Brubaker 2017). The influential critique of Evgeny Morozov (2012) 
emphasizes “the dark side of Internet freedom” and calls it “the Net Delusion”38. Big data 
collected and commercialized by private oligopolies such as Google or Facebook have now 
emerged as risks for democracy. They are no longer considered to be the electronic agora 
of the twenty-first century, but rather threaten to infringe on the constitutional rights of 
individual privacy. Accusations have emerged that the cyberspace can be used by bots and 
other tools to influence electoral outcomes, as it was alleged to be the case with Russian 
bots and Cambridge Analytica in the US presidential elections in 2016.
At present, the perception of digitalization in general and the “digitalization of democracy” 
in particular oscillate between euphoric projections and fundamental critique. Therefore, it 
is important to look from an unbiased position at the chances and risks of digitalization 
for four specific and crucial functions within the democratic system: communication, 
participation, representation, and decision making.
Communication
The media scientist Gerhard Vowe (2014) has diagnosed an ongoing transformation of 
the public sphere. The key terms he is using to describe that transformation are volatility, 
virality, and plurality. Volatility describes the increased speed of communicative actions, 
reactions, and absence of communicative sustainability. Virality means that the relevance 
criteria for news and messages are changing. The selection of news are more driven by 
“likes”, “dislikes”, “sharing”, and non-transparent algorithms than by the traditional criterion 
of “importance” selected by journalists, experts, and politicians. Plurality indicates the 
new fragmentation of the public sphere. The dominance of national newspapers, political 
magazines, and TV stations has been eroded by thousands of new online media, blogs, 
platforms, Twitter, social media, and so forth. Cyber-optimists emphasize the greater 
plurality and the disempowerment of oligopolistic big media or the state and praise the 
emergence of a supposedly power-free sphere of communication. Sceptics argue that there 
might be a pluralistic new online media world, but that this change comes with two negative 
developments. First, the public sphere will increasingly fragment and close itself off from 
public control and quality control in accordance with professional journalistic standards. 
This may burden collective opinion-formation already in the shorter run and collective 
action in the longer run.
Moreover, media research tells us that people have a tendency to consume only those 
news, blogs, and debates and join only those platforms where they hear the echo of their 
own opinions or prejudices. At least for the German example, it is above all the supporters 
38 Morozov goes beyond the democratic OECD world and stresses the effectiveness of the Internet as a tool for 
autocrats to control their subjects.
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of the (populist) far-right parties who communicate primarily in their own echo chambers 
(Maurer 2017). We have to search for tools counteracting the upward spiralling and mutual 
reinforcement of hate speech or all those opinions that would not have been expressed 
in the offline world of face-to-face communication. Second, the ubiquity of abundant 
information will increase the problem of quality selection of the mixed plethora of news 
and opinions. It requires a high level of media and political competence to distinguish news 
from subjective opinions, facts from fakes. Citizens with low levels of education, knowledge, 
and political competence are in danger of becoming the first victims of fake news. This 
is another example where the Internet may increase the already existing offline political 
inequality to the disadvantage of the lower-(educated) classes.
Participation
The boundaries between political communication and participation are already not easy 
to draw in the offline world. In online media, they tend to evaporate. Is it already political 
participation if an individual signals his/her (dis-)agreement with a particular political 
position per mouse click by clicking the like or dislike button or signing an online petition? Be 
as it may, one of the hopes of the first enthusiasts of cyber democracy was that the Internet 
will revolutionize political participation. Twenty years later, empirical research has delivered 
more sobering news. Political participation is as selective online as it is in the offline world. 
The so-called silent majority of 50 percent of the population does not participate beyond 
elections (Vowe 2014, 38). The Internet has not changed this lack of interest. For the 
participation opportunities offered through web 2.0, there is a rule of thumb (at least as far 
as the users in Germany are concerned): Less than 50 per cent actually take advantage and 
within this 50 per cent, there is a 90-9-1-percent pyramid. Ninety percent being lurkers who 
participate sporadically. Nine per cent are infrequent post contributors, while 1 percent of 
the posters are responsible for 90 percent of the posts (ibid.). This reflects to a large extent 
the participation rates in offline politics.
Electronic voting39 (remote electronic voting or “E-voting”) is the most conventional form 
of political participation in or through the Internet (Goldsmith and Ruthrauff 2013; Kersting 
2014). There is already some empirical research about the structure, selectivity, and security 
of E-voting, but most of these studies are case-driven. Estonia as the most successful case 
is well-researched, for example; other countries certainly less so. E-voting has become 
statistically massive in the small Baltic country irrespective of age, gender, education, or 
income. Although it seems to be used by young voters in particular, E-voting does not seem 
to have increased the total numbers of voters in Estonia (Mulligan 2017). This suspicion 
has also been emphasized more generally by other earlier studies (Norris 2004; Smith 
2005; Hall 2012). In the short run, the so-called digital divide might exacerbate the social 
selectivity of voting between those who use the Internet and those who do not. This may 
disappear in the medium run, but most electoral researchers agree that it is the level of 
political interest that matters and not the comfortability of voting. Graham Smith (2005, 
21) argued convincingly that technology may increase the comfortability of voting, but 
comfortability was never a relevant reason why people voted or did not vote.
Beyond increasing the number of voters and reducing the social selectivity at the ballot in 
the long run, there are additional issues discussed regarding E-voting. Security and vote 
39 There are different forms of electronic voting. Here we only consider voting through the Internet, i.e., so-cal-
led I-voting, and not simply electronic voting machines in ballot booths, which does not makes e-voting different 
from traditional paper ballot voting.
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fraud or the manipulations of elections by foreign powers are unresolved issues. Although 
the security and privacy of voting have not been a matter of dispute so far in Estonia, 
experts do not rule out that E-voting is not entirely immune to manipulation, fraud, and 
violations of the secrecy of the ballot. Moreover, some critics emphasize that voting is a 
ceremonial republican act. Voting at home through the Internet or with the iPhone when 
you are out with friends would further trivialize this fundamental democratic act for which 
“people died for and continue to die for” (Mulligan 2017).
The scattered empirical findings we have on Internet voting suggest that there are no 
substantial differences between online and offline participation in general elections, neither 
quantitatively nor in terms of social selectivity.
Representation and Decision
There are other forms of digital participation and digital democratization that oscillate 
between participation and representation. They are used to strengthen the internal 
democracy of political parties and big social organizations such as trade unions and 
transnational NGOs. Political organizations such as parties have begun to use electronic 
tools to let the members directly elect their chairpersons, approve coalition agreements, 
or express concrete opinions on specific policy proposals. There are signs that the Internet 
offers platforms and opportunities to members and sympathizers to participate in opinion 
formation and even decisions (internal elections or on programmatic issues) where they 
had previously been excluded for various reasons, including technical ones. However, we 
do not yet have systematic empirical work on where these electronic tools are used, where 
not, what the impact on party (organizational) internal democracy is and what it means for 
the strength and weakness of those parties in the context of electoral competition. Since 
political parties are under particular pressure and most of them are plagued with declining 
memberships, the question is whether they can rejuvenate themselves through the use of 
digital instruments. The use of the software “liquid democracy” by Pirate Parties, which have 
emerged as left-leaning grassroots-democratic digital political parties in various countries, 
has not been a success, but rather a platform that nurtures distrust, disorder, and splits (see 
Merkel 2015, 77ff.)40 
Within civil society, national and transnational NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, Transparency International, or various civic watchdogs on political corruption 
and lobby control have used the Internet to broaden their activities and make them more 
effective. These measures have turned out to be more successful than those of political 
parties; the Australian democracy theorist John Keane (2011) has written in this vein of an 
emerging monitory democracy, where civic organizations closely monitor those in power. In 
this sense, monitory democracy is a mixed form of participation: NGOs and civic activists 
directly participate, but they also monitor the representatives in parliament and government 
on behalf of the society, from which they claim to have a moral mandate (Keane 2011, 
212ff.; Saward 2011, 74ff.).
Beyond party organizations or NGOs, one of the digital promises for the beginning of the 
twenty-first century is so-called liquid democracy. The vision is that digital tools can fluidify 
the borders between communication, participation, representation, and decision making. 
There is no coherent concept of liquid democracy, but there is a basic idea, some crucial 
expectations, and specific software. The visionary idea is to materialize an individualized 
40 The Italian populist movement Cinque Stelle has introduced e-software as well.
62 Past, Present and Future of Democracy
concept of the old Rousseauian idea of overcoming the separation of represented and 
representatives in order to create an identitarian democracy. Such a democracy can be 
seen as a form of plebiscitarian self-government. Individual citizens have the choice to 
participate in the discussion before a material decision is reached and take part in these 
decisions on their own, but they can also “delegate” their voting rights to other citizens or 
organizations whom they trust and whose competence they believe in (see inter alia Miller 
1969, 107ff.; Ford 2002, 4). According to Ford (ibid.), such delegated voting is premised on 
the following:
• Each citizen can decide if he or she wants to vote directly in apolitical or policy questions 
or to delegate that vote instead.
• The delegates do not know for whom they are voting in order to avoid social pressure 
on the Internet.
• The vote of the delegates has to be public so that the delegating citizens can control 
the vote of their delegates. 
• Delegates can delegate their voting rights to other delegates. Those delegates who 
accumulate many votes are called super-delegates.
The idea of liquid democracy is hard to criticize from a normative point of view. Nevertheless, 
the characteristics of its materialization threaten to violate at least two democratic 
principles: transparency and accountability. If the delegation of votes occurs over multiple 
steps, the delegating citizens cannot follow anymore what happened with their votes. 
However, if there is no transparency, there can be no accountability. Liquid democracy as 
an idea promises a brave new world: flexible, inclusive, fluid, direct or indirect. The individual 
citizen has the ultimate choice. Nevertheless, transparency and accountability are sacrificed 
for the vision of a liquid democratic world.
There are certainly more aspects, forms, and opportunities of digital democracy. They 
cannot be analysed here in detail, but some can at least be named: 
• Participatory budgeting, which was “invented” in Porto Alegre, Brazil and exported to 
various countries, in most cases with much less participation of the citizens than in the 
country of its origin.
• E-government provides citizens with access to a wide range of public bureaucratic 
services; while this is certainly an improvement, it should not be euphemistically called 
e-government, but rather e-bureaucracy.
• FixMyStreet is a digital platform used in several countries all over the world; it is one of 
the most widespread digital innovations; it gave rise to several other digital innovations 
that draw on the geo-localization/mapping of urban problems. 
• Wikigovernment tries to overcome the tension between the epistemic quality of 
decision making (expert-government) and input (participation) legitimacy through 
wiki-government software (Noveck 2009) whereby the wisdom of crowds is used as 
crowdsourcing in policymaking.
• As scattered as the practices and experiences with digital democratic innovations 
across countries are, so, too, is our empirically grounded knowledge about it.
• Needs for Further Research
• What we are lacking regarding E-voting are systematic comparisons of the various 
national experiences with voting through the Internet. We need here more detailed and 
cross-national research to find out where the best practices are, why they function, and 
whether they can be transferred to other countries. 
• Even if we find out that E-voting may not increase the number of voters, we still have to 
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investigate whether it at least stops the rising trend of abstention among the youngest 
age cohorts, which has developed into a relevant problem for advanced democracies.
• How can one develop cyber formats that can reach out to those who are politically not 
strongly motivated and/or coming from low-education backgrounds and draw them 
into meaningful electronic arenas of political communication and participation?
• Empirical research on how digital innovations can improve the relation between citizens 
and their representatives.
To Sum up Democratic Innovations
Democratic innovations (including referenda) can be relevant instruments to democratize 
our democracies. For the most part, there are no incompatibilities between them and the 
principal procedures of representative democracies. These instruments are more relevant 
for democratic participation than for authoritative decision making. For the latter, they often 
lack democratic legitimacy. This is particularly true for deliberative democracy and to a large 
extent for digital democracy as well. It does not apply to referenda, since the democratic 
subject, the people, decides on substantial policies and political questions. Nevertheless, 
the same argument applies to referenda as it does to the democratic innovations: their 
substantial share of the overall volume of political decisions is rather small. This applies 
even for Switzerland, the referendum democracy par excellence, where on the federal level 
only 7 per cent of all laws are produced by referenda. The rest are decisions taken by the 
parliament (Vatter 2014, 374).
2�5�4 Conclusion: Shifting Patterns of Democratic Legitimacy
Democratic legitimacy is constituted by two equally important dimensions: the normative 
dimension (including democratic core principles, institutions, procedures) and the empirical 
dimension (legitimacy belief): that is, do the people believe that their concrete democratic 
system and its institutions, procedures, and output/outcomes are legitimate, and if so, to 
what degree?
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Figure 15: The two dimensions of democratic legitimacy
A democratic system that is deemed worthy of recognition on normative grounds draws its 
sustenance from central democratic values and norms as well as its democratic genesis. In 
turn, the empirical ascription of recognition by the citizenry should ideally follow from shared 
convictions about norms and values, from just, fair, and accepted procedures, and from 
outcomes that are conducive to the working of democracy. In other words, we can speak 
of a democratically legitimate system when democratic values, norms, and procedures are 
present and shared or internalized by the citizens, and when system outputs and outcomes 
functionally favourable to democracy are perceived as just and fair.
The performance of a democratic regime exerts a decisive influence on the (material) 
outcome side. In turn, values and norms are incorporated into the procedures themselves, 
but they also play a key role in the citizens’ evaluations of the democratic output. All these 
observations make it clear that the components of legitimacy are closely intertwined. 
Interdependence of the Components of Legitimacy
The components, conditions, and sources of legitimacy do not spring forth independently 
of one another; rather, they strengthen or weaken one another reciprocally, as suggested 
above. Here are a few conceivable hypotheses and connections.
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• All other things being equal, belief in legitimacy should become more robust as the 
requirements of democracy are met more fully and the material performance of the 
entire democratic system in its political, economic, and social manifestations becomes 
more convincing.
• In turn, the legitimating power of democratic procedures should be notably enhanced 
the more the latter can fulfil their own normative premises, and the more they are able 
to produce the outputs/outcomes that citizens expect. 
• Constitutionalists believe that procedures can be legitimized solely on their own 
terms. In contrast to that view, it appears to us that there may be positive or negative 
feedback loops among formal procedures, material results, and democratic legitimacy. 
Even legally established, impeccable procedures lose normative legitimacy as well as 
empirical legitimation when they systematically generate results that undermine their 
own foundations. This might happen in a number of ways. For example, such procedures 
objectively might favour or disadvantage certain groups, certain social strata (see chap. 
2.1.4), or financial investors (see chap. 2.4); they might restrict liberties in favour of 
presumed gains in security.
• There could also be a shift from elected representative bodies such as political parties, 
parliament, or governments (so-called “majoritarian institutions) to technocrats, central 
banks, courts, and bureaucracies (non-majoritarian institutions).
The components of legitimacy display not only tight functional interdependence, but also 
a precarious normative balance. Shortcomings in one of the sources of legitimacy (values 
and norms, procedures, material outcomes) cannot be compensated for automatically by 
arbitrary improvements in the others. Thus, for example, a boost in material welfare cannot, 
by themselves, serve as a justification for executive- or expertise-driven decisions (say, by 
the IMF or the central bank) that sidestep parliamentary channels, even if this produces 
an output desired by the citizens. A belief in legitimacy held by (a majority of) the demos 
is certainly not sufficient to establish democratic legitimacy. It has to remain linked to the 
appropriate democratic values, norms, and procedures. Conversely, democracies can be 
undermined if they consistently generate suboptimal outcomes such as lagging material 
welfare or morally unacceptable and/or divisive decisions. Furthermore, in changing 
contexts, traditional, tried-and-true democratic procedures may lose the functional and 
normative virtues that they once had. Thus—and this is not their least important quality—
democratic procedures must function in self-reflexive and self-adaptive ways (see above 
and cf. inter alia Rosanvallon 2011, 151ff.). If they do not demonstrate such flexibility, 
they threaten to become anachronistic and incapable of meeting the challenges posed by 
their environment. This is one of the criticisms levelled against elections and structures of 
representation by various theorists and scholars of democracy, including Crouch (2004), 
Manin (2007), Rosanvallon (2011; 2018), Streeck (2013), Mair (2014), and Keane (2016). 
Since democratic legitimacy is not an either/or, but a matter of degree, we can empirically 
observe shifts in legitimacy belief (e.g., Eurobarometer: Satisfaction with democracy; trust 
in majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions), but we can also look at shifts in the 
normative quality of democracy (Democracy Barometer).
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Figure 16: Quality of democracy of the 30 best democracies worldwide
Annual averages for the 30 best democracies of the Democracy Barometer.
Source: Democracy Barometer.
The figure above shows that the average normative quality, measured by roughly 100 
indicators, of the 30 best democracies, including most of the Western European democracies, 
has not declined since 1990. The alarmist diagnoses that the most advanced democracies 
are in a deep crisis cannot, then, be confirmed by systematic empirical research. 
Is the same true if we look at the people’s legitimacy belief, as measured by the subjective 
“satisfaction with democracy” (Eurobarometer)? The grey columns indicate the average 
proportion of respondents in all member states (while they were members of the EU) who 
are “very satisfied” with democracy. In 1973, when the EU had only 12 members, 50 per 
cent of respondents were highly satisfied. Forty years later, with the European Union now 
comprising 28 member states, there is an even higher proportion of those highly satisfied 
with democracy (ca. 57%). Seen from the subjective dimension of the citizens’ belief, the 
democratic legitimacy of the democratic system as a whole has not decreased during the 
last four decades.
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Figure 17: Satisfaction with democracy in the EU (1973-2017)
Source: Eurobarometer (1973-2017).
However, this picture of the system as a whole conceals more problematic developments, 
as the next Figure 18 reveals. The people were also asked how much they trust specific 
institutions. On the left side, we see parties, parliaments, and governments, which one can 
call “majoritarian institutions”. They were elected on the basis of electoral majorities and 
decide on the latter’s behalf, often according to the same majority principle. The right side 
of the figure displays the people’s trust in institutions such as the military, police, and the 
judiciary. In these institutions, the personnel is selected according to meritocratic and not 
democratic principles and decisions are reached according to non-majoritarian principles. 
For the period from 1994 to 2017, where solid Eurobarometer survey data are available, 
trust in parliaments and governments declined significantly and trust in political parties 
remained at the very low level of 20 per cent. By contrast, the non-majoritarian institutions 
of the state enjoyed high and stable levels of trust, much higher than the democratically 
elected institutions. Thus, a paradox of democracy arises. The people do not trust very much 
those institutions that they can vote for, but they do trust institutions that they cannot vote 
for and that are not accountable to them. “A shift in preferences seems to be taking place 
in the minds of citizens: expertise, unpolitical administration, and rapid decision hierarchies 
are valued over voice, pluralistic competition, parliamentary deliberation, and the limited 
capability of governments to solve problems” (Krause and Merkel 2018, 42). There has been 
a shift in the empirical dimension of democratic legitimacy from institutions of democratic 
representation to non-partisan institutions to which expertise and efficiency are ascribed.
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Figure 18: Trust in majoritarian and non-majoritarian democracies (1994-
2017)
Only during the last few years does the downward trend seem to have been broken and 
given way to an increase of trust in representative institutions. Nevertheless, the trust in the 
core democratic institutions remains low in contrast to the procedures of direct democracy 
we have discussed in chapter 2.5.
There are two reactions to this development that can be observed. The first is the 
renationalization of parts of the political societies all over Europe mobilized by populist 
politics (see chap. 2.3.1). The other reaction consists in creative inventions of new forms of 
political participation and communication. As much as some of these innovations can be 
criticized, it cannot be denied that they are driven by democratic citizens and politicians. It 
depends on the type and effectiveness of reform and innovation whether the challenges to 
democracy such as technocracy, populism, and renationalization can be successfully dealt 
with. 
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Figure 19: Challenges to democratic legitimacy, reform, and innovation
However, democratic reforms have to go beyond such innovations. The core of well-
developed territorial mass democracies has to be representative institutions, which likewise 
have to be reformed. Political parties, parliaments, and governments have to continue 
to become more transparent and accountable to the people. They should not deny the 
constitutive role of antagonistic interests in modern capitalist societies and cannot be silent 
about the difficulty of integration into heterogeneous societies; but they should be able to 
transform these antagonistic interests into agonistic expressions of political conflict that are 
compatible with the principles of democracy. This goes beyond the institutional structure of 
democracies and aims at the responsiveness and responsibility of the political elites.
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3� General Recommendations for the Future of 
Democracy Research
General remark: There is an abundant literature on so-called “democratic innovations”, 
which is enlightening, useful and important for our understanding of democracy beyond 
traditional democratic representation via general elections, parliament, and government. 
Nevertheless, this strand of research needs to be better linked to the research on elections, 
parties, parliaments, and governments. It has to be more critically discussed to what extent 
these democratic innovations complement, strengthen or weaken the core representative 
institutions of our “mass democracies” within national and supranational settings of 
democracy.
Moreover, we need more thorough analyses of the procedures, organizations, and institutions 
of democracy such as elections, political parties, parliament as well as the challenges to 
them and their impact on the working of democracy as a whole. They are in particular stress 
today and are challenged by political actors and academic researchers alike. In order to 
systematically examine the fragility of today’s established democracies, we should look at 
three interdependent levels of the democratic system: the micro level, the meso level, and 
the macro level.
On the micro level of political attitudes, behaviour, voting, and participation, we should 
analyse specific trends that are problematic for stability on the meso level of political 
parties as well as the macro level of the core institutions of representative democracy.
Micro level: (examples)
• Electoral volatility: what does its steep increase mean for political parties, the party 
system, and the continuity and effectiveness of governing?
• What are the causes and consequences of the decline of voter turnout in Eastern 
Europe and what are the causes of the recent increase of turnout in Western Europe? 
• What causes the new polarization of party competition and public discourses? How can 
democracy counter the negative consequences of this?
• What causes the social selectivity of electoral participation? What can we learn from 
“good” and “bad” practices in different countries?
• Meso level (examples)
• What causes the decline of catch-all parties, what impact does this have on party 
competition, deliberation, and decision making in parliament, and how does it impact 
coalition-building and effective government?
• What effects does the decline of catch-all parties have on the cohesion, integration, or 
disintegration of European societies?
• Why are right-wing populists in some countries stronger than in others?
• What are the differences in the impact on democratic governing if right-wing populists 
are in opposition, junior partners, or senior partners in governing coalitions, in 
consolidated and less consolidated democracies?
• Is there a new cultural cleavage between well-educated urban “cosmopolitans” and 
less-educated rural “communitarians” that restructures the mode of competition in 
European party systems?
• Macro level (examples)
• European party systems have become more volatile, polarized, and fragmented. 
Will this make more difficult the forming of stable coalition governments that are 
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ideologically close enough to produce solid policy responses to the social, economic, 
and environmental challenges of our times? 
• Will the imbalance between global deregulated markets and the nation state endure and 
will global firms have the power to undermine the proper functioning of a democratic, 
tax, or welfare state?
• Can the EU strengthen democratic checks vis-à-vis markets? Is the European Union 
able and willing to promote “positive integration”, i.e., reregulating markets in which 
legitimate democratic interventions have lost their effectiveness?
• Are we living in times of shifting axes of legitimacy? From liberal to populist, from 
multilateral to unilateral, from supranational to national, and from consensual to 
majoritarian modes of legitimating political rule? What causes differences in the 
strength of different modes of political legitimacy in different countries?
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nt
ita
tiv
e,
 a
nd
 a
n 
ac
tiv
e 
ci
tiz
en
sh
ip
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 
sc
ho
ol
s,
 t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
ill
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 m
ul
tif
ac
et
ed
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
t 
fa
ct
or
s 
in
flu
en
ci
ng
 t
he
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 o
f 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
 o
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 o
f 
th
e 
w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 y
ou
ng
 p
eo
pl
e 
en
ga
ge
 in
 s
oc
ie
ty
, o
ff
er
in
g 
po
lic
ym
ak
er
s 
ne
w
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 “c
on
ce
pt
ua
l l
en
se
s”
 t
o 
be
tt
er
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
is
 g
en
er
at
io
n,
 
ho
w
 t
he
y 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 p
ub
lic
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
an
d 
ho
w
 t
he
y 
en
ga
ge
 m
at
er
ia
lly
 a
nd
 
sy
m
bo
lic
al
ly
 in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e 
in
 t
he
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 t
he
 s
oc
ie
tie
s 
th
ey
 
in
ha
bi
t 
an
d 
sh
ap
e 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l r
eg
im
es
 u
nd
er
 w
hi
ch
 t
he
y 
liv
e.
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bE
U
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tiz
en
 
– 
Ba
rr
ie
rs
 
to
w
ar
ds
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
ci
tiz
en
sh
ip
CA
TC
H
-E
yo
U
 
– 
Co
ns
tr
uc
tin
g 
Ac
tiv
e 
Ci
tiz
en
sh
ip
 w
ith
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 Y
ou
th
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Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
co
m
pa
ra
tiv
el
y 
st
ud
ie
d 
th
e 
us
e 
an
d 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
(P
TA
) a
nd
 e
xp
er
t-
ba
se
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
(T
A)
 in
 
sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 p
ol
ic
y 
in
 s
ev
er
al
 E
U
 m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
. 
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
st
ud
ie
d 
qu
es
tio
ns
 r
eg
ar
di
ng
 T
A 
an
d 
PT
A 
on
 x
en
ot
ra
ns
pl
an
ta
tio
n 
po
lic
ie
s 
in
 t
he
 1
99
0s
 a
nd
 e
ar
ly
 2
00
0s
. R
es
ul
ts
 s
ho
w
ed
 t
ha
t 
ci
tiz
en
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n,
 in
 t
er
m
s 
of
 P
TA
, w
as
 r
ar
el
y 
us
ed
 in
 x
en
ot
ra
ns
pl
an
ta
tio
n 
po
lic
ym
ak
in
g.
 R
at
he
r 
ci
vi
l s
er
va
nt
s 
an
d 
ex
pe
rt
s 
w
er
e 
th
e 
ac
to
rs
 m
os
t 
he
av
ily
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 p
ol
ic
y 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t.
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
as
se
ss
es
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
ci
tiz
en
sh
ip
 a
s 
en
ac
te
d 
by
 c
iti
ze
ns
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
no
n-
ci
tiz
en
s 
(t
hi
rd
-c
ou
nt
ry
 n
at
io
na
ls
, r
ef
ug
ee
s,
 il
le
ga
l a
lie
ns
). 
Th
e 
go
al
 w
as
 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
m
ea
ni
ng
 g
iv
en
 t
o 
th
e 
id
ea
 o
f 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p 
by
 t
ho
se
 
w
ho
se
 a
ct
s 
cr
ea
te
 n
ew
 f
or
m
s 
of
 id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n.
 T
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 s
ho
w
ed
 t
ha
t 
ac
ts
 
of
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p—
th
os
e 
ac
ts
 t
hr
ou
gh
 w
hi
ch
 s
ub
je
ct
s 
co
ns
tit
ut
e 
th
em
se
lv
es
 a
s 
Eu
ro
pe
an
—
w
ill
 v
ar
y 
co
ns
id
er
ab
ly
 r
efl
ec
tin
g 
va
rio
us
 t
ra
je
ct
or
ie
s,
 t
er
rit
or
ie
s,
 a
nd
 
cu
ltu
re
s.
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
is
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
 w
ith
 t
he
 le
gi
tim
ac
y 
of
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 in
 d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 s
o-
ca
lle
d 
fa
st
- 
an
d 
sl
ow
-b
ur
ni
ng
 c
ris
es
. T
he
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
te
am
s 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
re
e 
ar
ea
s:
 b
an
ki
ng
 c
ris
es
 a
nd
 fi
sc
al
 s
us
ta
in
ab
ili
ty
; d
efi
ci
t 
re
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ui
ty
 o
f 
pu
bl
ic
 s
er
vi
ce
s;
 y
ou
th
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
an
d 
in
cl
us
iv
e 
gr
ow
th
. T
he
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
ar
e 
to
 m
ap
 h
ow
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 a
nd
 e
xp
er
t 
ne
tw
or
ks
 h
an
dl
e 
cr
is
es
, d
iff
er
en
tia
te
 h
ow
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
m
od
es
 o
f 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 
re
la
te
 t
o 
cr
is
es
 a
nd
 a
rt
ic
ul
at
e 
w
ha
t 
m
od
es
 o
f 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 a
re
 b
es
t 
su
ite
d 
to
 
ad
dr
es
si
ng
 c
ris
es
.
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Th
e 
go
al
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
is
 t
o 
in
qu
ire
 in
to
 t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 t
en
si
on
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
su
pr
an
at
io
na
l E
U
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
an
d 
po
pu
la
r 
m
ob
ili
za
tio
n 
an
d 
th
e 
na
tio
na
l 
le
ve
l c
rit
ic
al
ly
 q
ue
st
io
ni
ng
 E
U
 d
riv
en
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
EU
 le
gi
tim
ac
y.
 It
 is
 b
as
ed
 
on
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
on
 t
he
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
pu
bl
ic
 o
pi
ni
on
, n
at
io
na
l 
an
d 
su
pr
an
at
io
na
l p
ol
iti
ca
l e
lit
es
. T
he
 s
ur
ve
y 
of
 6
42
 n
at
io
na
l r
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
po
lit
ic
ia
ns
 o
n 
ec
on
om
y,
 im
m
ig
ra
tio
n,
 a
nd
 s
ec
ur
ity
 s
ho
w
ed
 h
ow
 a
 s
tr
on
g 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
po
lit
ic
al
 e
lit
es
 in
 E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
re
st
 e
xi
st
s,
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 o
n 
to
pi
cs
 r
eg
ar
di
ng
 im
m
ig
ra
tio
n.
Th
e 
Eu
ro
Po
lis
 p
ro
je
ct
 e
xp
lo
re
d 
th
e 
fo
rm
s 
of
 d
em
oc
ra
tic
 d
efi
ci
t 
th
at
 a
re
 
di
re
ct
ly
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
EU
 c
iti
ze
ns
. T
he
 c
en
tr
al
 q
ue
st
io
n 
of
 t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
as
 if
 
ci
tiz
en
 in
vo
lv
em
en
t 
in
 in
cl
us
iv
e,
 in
fo
rm
ed
, a
nd
 t
ho
ug
ht
fu
l d
el
ib
er
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
EU
 in
cr
ea
se
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 p
ol
iti
ca
lly
 r
el
ev
an
t 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 c
iti
ze
ns
’ 
po
lit
ic
al
 e
ng
ag
em
en
t 
in
 t
he
 E
U
 p
ub
lic
 a
ff
ai
rs
, p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
le
gi
tim
ac
y 
of
 E
U
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
, a
 s
en
se
 o
f 
be
lo
ng
in
g 
to
 t
he
 E
U
, a
nd
 v
ot
er
 t
ur
no
ut
 in
 E
U
 
pa
rli
am
en
ta
ry
 e
le
ct
io
ns
? 
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
or
ga
ni
ze
d 
a 
sp
ec
ia
l t
w
o-
da
y 
m
ul
til
in
gu
al
 
ev
en
t 
on
e 
w
ee
k 
ah
ea
d 
of
 t
he
 2
00
9 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 P
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 e
le
ct
io
ns
 in
 
Br
us
se
ls
 t
ha
t 
w
as
 a
tt
en
de
d 
by
 a
ro
un
d 
40
0 
ci
tiz
en
s 
fr
om
 a
ll 
27
 m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
. E
ur
oP
ol
is
 il
lu
st
ra
te
s 
th
at
 t
he
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 t
o 
en
ga
ge
 in
 r
ea
l d
eb
at
e 
is
 a
 
m
or
e 
eff
ec
tiv
e 
m
ea
ns
 t
o 
m
ob
ili
ze
 p
ol
iti
ca
l p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
th
an
 e
nd
le
ss
 m
ed
ia
 
ca
m
pa
ig
ns
 a
nd
 p
ub
lic
 r
el
at
io
ns
 e
xe
rc
is
es
 a
nd
 h
as
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
po
si
tiv
e 
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n 
w
ith
 t
he
 E
U
.
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EU
RO
SP
H
ER
E 
w
is
he
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 in
no
va
tiv
e 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
 o
n 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
ph
er
e 
th
at
 b
es
t 
su
it 
to
 h
an
dl
e 
th
e 
di
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 s
oc
ie
tie
s.
 T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 
w
an
te
d 
to
 in
qu
ire
 in
to
 h
ow
 p
ol
iti
ca
l i
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
an
d 
ag
gr
eg
at
io
n 
of
 in
te
re
st
s 
on
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
is
su
es
 c
an
 h
ap
pe
n 
at
 m
ul
tip
le
 le
ve
ls
 a
cr
os
s 
va
rio
us
 t
yp
es
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
iv
e 
sp
ac
es
. W
hi
le
 d
oi
ng
 t
hi
s,
 t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 t
re
at
ed
 e
lit
es
/e
xp
er
ts
, 
po
lit
ic
al
 p
ar
tie
s,
 s
oc
ia
l m
ov
em
en
ts
, c
iti
ze
ns
’ i
ni
tia
tiv
es
, a
nd
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c/
pr
in
t 
m
ed
ia
 a
s 
bo
th
 p
ol
iti
ca
l/s
oc
ia
l a
ct
or
s 
an
d 
as
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
iv
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
pa
ce
s 
an
d 
as
se
ss
 t
he
ir 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 t
he
 a
rt
ic
ul
at
io
n 
of
 d
iv
er
se
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 p
ub
lic
 s
ph
er
es
.
Th
e 
Fa
irT
ax
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
pr
oj
ec
t 
w
ill
 p
ro
du
ce
 r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 o
n 
ho
w
 f
ai
r 
an
d 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
ta
xa
tio
n 
on
 s
oc
ia
l p
ol
ic
y 
re
fo
rm
s 
ca
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
st
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
EU
 m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
. H
ow
 c
an
 s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 t
ax
at
io
n 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 
po
lic
y 
re
fo
rm
s 
pr
om
ot
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 e
qu
al
ity
 a
nd
 s
ec
ur
ity
, e
nh
an
ce
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
ha
rm
on
iz
at
io
n 
of
 t
ax
at
io
n,
 e
nh
an
ce
 s
oc
ia
l i
nc
lu
si
on
 a
nd
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y?
 T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 u
se
s 
m
et
ho
ds
 a
nd
 t
he
or
ie
s 
ba
se
d 
in
 la
w
, e
co
no
m
ic
s,
 
ac
co
un
tin
g,
 e
th
no
gr
ap
hy
, g
en
de
r 
st
ud
ie
s,
 e
co
no
m
ic
 h
is
to
ry
, b
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
st
at
is
tic
s 
to
 a
ns
w
er
 t
he
se
 k
ey
 q
ue
st
io
ns
.
FE
SS
U
D
 is
 a
 m
ul
tid
is
ci
pl
in
ar
y,
 p
lu
ra
lis
tic
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
hi
ch
 a
im
s 
to
 f
or
ge
 a
lli
an
ce
s 
ac
ro
ss
 t
he
 s
oc
ia
l s
ci
en
ce
s,
 s
o 
as
 t
o 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 h
ow
 fi
na
nc
es
 c
an
 b
et
te
r 
se
rv
e 
ec
on
om
ic
, s
oc
ia
l, 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l n
ee
ds
. S
om
e 
of
 t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
’s
 
ce
nt
ra
l i
ss
ue
s 
ar
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 s
uc
h 
as
: w
ha
t 
is
 fi
na
nc
ia
lis
at
io
n 
an
d 
ho
w
 h
as
 it
 
im
pa
ct
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ac
hi
ev
em
en
t 
of
 s
pe
ci
fic
 e
co
no
m
ic
, s
oc
ia
l a
nd
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
?; 
w
ha
t 
is
 t
he
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 t
he
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
fin
an
ci
al
is
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
of
 t
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ys
te
m
, e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t?
, e
tc
.
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Th
e 
pr
oj
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t 
st
ud
ie
d 
th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 a
nd
 e
du
ca
tio
na
l d
riv
er
s 
an
d 
th
e 
so
ci
al
, 
cu
ltu
ra
l a
nd
 p
ol
iti
ca
l i
m
pa
ct
s 
of
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 in
eq
ua
lit
y 
w
ith
 n
ov
el
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 
on
 t
he
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
of
 in
co
m
e,
 w
ea
lth
 a
nd
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
in
eq
ua
lit
y.
 G
IN
I 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
an
 in
te
rd
is
ci
pl
in
ar
y 
an
al
ys
is
 t
ha
t 
dr
aw
s 
on
 e
co
no
m
ic
s,
 s
oc
io
lo
gy
, 
po
lit
ic
al
 s
ci
en
ce
 a
nd
 h
ea
lth
 s
tu
di
es
, w
ith
 im
pr
ov
ed
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gi
es
, u
ni
fo
rm
 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t, 
w
id
e 
co
un
tr
y 
co
ve
ra
ge
, a
 c
le
ar
 p
ol
ic
y 
di
m
en
si
on
 a
nd
 b
ro
ad
 
di
ss
em
in
at
io
n.
 T
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 s
ho
w
ed
 t
ha
t 
in
co
m
e 
in
eq
ua
lit
y 
ha
s 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 b
ee
n 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
, b
ut
 t
he
re
 a
re
 m
ar
ke
d 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
ac
ro
ss
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
in
 in
eq
ua
lit
y 
tr
en
ds
 a
nd
 im
pa
ct
s,
 h
ig
hl
ig
ht
in
g 
th
e 
im
po
rt
an
t 
ro
le
 o
f 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 a
nd
 p
ol
ic
ie
s,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ed
uc
at
io
n,
 w
hi
ch
 n
ee
d 
to
 b
e 
be
tt
er
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d.
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
st
ud
ie
d 
po
ve
rt
y,
 s
oc
ia
l p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
so
ci
al
 in
no
va
tio
n 
in
 E
ur
op
e 
w
ith
 
fo
cu
s 
on
 t
w
o 
ce
nt
ra
l q
ue
st
io
ns
: (
1)
 h
ow
 c
an
 s
oc
ia
l c
oh
es
io
n 
be
 a
ch
ie
ve
d 
in
 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 (2
) h
ow
 c
an
 s
oc
ia
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
co
m
pl
em
en
t, 
re
in
fo
rc
e 
an
d 
m
od
ify
 
m
ac
ro
-l
ev
el
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
an
d 
vi
ce
 v
er
sa
. T
he
 a
im
 is
 t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
fo
r 
ev
id
en
ce
 b
as
ed
 p
ol
ic
ym
ak
in
g 
in
 E
ur
op
e,
 b
ot
h 
in
 t
he
 s
ho
rt
 a
nd
 in
 t
he
 lo
ng
 t
er
m
.
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
th
e 
to
pi
c 
“T
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
gr
ow
th
 a
ge
nd
a”
 a
nd
 in
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 in
no
va
tio
n-
ba
se
d 
gr
ow
th
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
fo
r 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 g
lo
ba
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
in
no
va
tio
n 
ne
tw
or
ks
. T
he
 m
ai
n 
go
al
 w
as
 fi
rs
t 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 n
ov
el
 a
nd
 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 d
ia
gn
os
tic
s 
of
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
no
va
tio
n,
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
dy
na
m
ic
s 
an
d 
gr
ow
th
 in
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
ly
 g
lo
ba
liz
ed
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
liz
ed
 w
or
ld
 
ec
on
om
y.
 S
ec
on
d,
 o
n 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
 o
f 
su
ch
 d
ia
gn
os
tic
s,
 t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 e
la
bo
ra
te
d 
po
lic
y 
sc
en
ar
io
s 
an
d 
de
liv
er
ed
 a
 c
oh
er
en
t 
po
lic
y 
to
ol
ki
t 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 t
he
 E
ur
op
e 
20
20
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 o
f 
sm
ar
t, 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
an
d 
in
cl
us
iv
e 
gr
ow
th
.
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pa
ct
IM
PR
O
VE
 –
 P
ov
er
ty
 
Re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 
Eu
ro
pe
: S
oc
ia
l 
Po
lic
y 
an
d 
In
no
va
tio
n
IS
IG
RO
W
TH
 –
 
In
no
va
tio
n-
fu
el
ed
, 
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e,
 
In
cl
us
iv
e 
G
ro
w
th
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D
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LI
VE
W
H
AT
 a
im
ed
 t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
ev
id
en
ce
-b
as
ed
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ab
ou
t 
ci
tiz
en
s’
 
re
si
lie
nc
e 
in
 t
im
es
 o
f 
ec
on
om
ic
 c
ris
es
 a
llo
w
in
g 
fo
r 
m
or
e 
eff
ec
tiv
e 
po
lit
y 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 t
he
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
su
ch
 c
ris
es
. T
he
 f
oc
us
 o
f 
th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 w
as
 o
n 
ci
tiz
en
s’
 r
es
po
ns
es
 (i
nd
iv
id
ua
l a
nd
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e)
, b
ut
 a
ls
o 
on
 
po
lic
y 
re
sp
on
se
s.
 A
tt
en
tio
n 
w
as
 t
hu
s 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 t
he
 b
ro
ad
 r
an
ge
 o
f 
co
pi
ng
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 w
hi
ch
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
ci
tiz
en
s 
m
ig
ht
 (o
r 
no
t)
 e
na
ct
 u
nd
er
 t
he
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
f 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 f
ac
to
rs
 s
uc
h 
as
 t
he
 s
co
pe
 o
f 
th
e 
cr
is
is
, p
ol
ic
y 
re
sp
on
se
s 
to
 t
he
 
cr
is
is
, p
ub
lic
 d
is
co
ur
se
s 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
cr
is
is
, a
nd
 t
he
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
of
 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 h
it 
by
 t
he
 c
ris
is
.
M
ed
ia
Ac
t 
w
as
 a
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 e
ff
or
t 
on
 m
ed
ia
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
sy
st
em
s 
(M
AS
) i
n 
EU
 m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
 a
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 f
or
 m
ed
ia
 p
lu
ra
lis
m
 in
 
Eu
ro
pe
. T
he
 m
ai
n 
go
al
s 
of
 t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
er
e:
 (1
) t
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
qu
an
tit
y 
an
d 
qu
al
ity
 o
f 
M
AS
 a
s 
pr
er
eq
ui
si
te
s 
fo
r 
pl
ur
al
is
tic
 d
eb
at
es
 a
bo
ut
 m
ed
ia
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 in
 t
im
es
 o
f 
gr
ow
in
g 
m
ed
ia
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n,
 (2
) t
o 
co
m
pa
re
 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
an
d 
in
no
va
tiv
e 
M
AS
 o
nl
in
e 
on
 d
iff
er
en
t 
m
ed
ia
 
sy
st
em
s 
an
d 
jo
ur
na
lis
m
 c
ul
tu
re
s 
in
 E
ur
op
e 
an
d 
be
yo
nd
, (
3)
 t
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
po
lic
y 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 f
or
 E
U
 m
ed
ia
 p
ol
ic
ym
ak
er
s.
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M
YP
LA
CE
 id
en
tifi
ed
 t
he
 o
bs
ta
cl
es
 t
o,
 a
nd
 f
ac
ili
ta
to
rs
 o
f, 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
’s
 
re
cl
am
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
re
na
 a
s 
‘m
y 
sp
ac
e’
. T
he
 s
pe
ci
fic
 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
M
YP
LA
CE
 w
er
e:
 (1
) T
o 
co
nt
ex
tu
al
is
e 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
’s
 c
iv
ic
 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
in
 r
eg
io
na
l, 
na
tio
na
l a
nd
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
hi
st
or
ic
al
 c
on
te
xt
s.
 (2
) T
o 
m
ap
 a
nd
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 t
he
 (r
e-
)p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 t
ra
ns
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 
(r
e)
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
of
 lo
ca
l, 
na
tio
na
l a
nd
 p
an
-E
ur
op
ea
n 
po
lit
ic
al
 h
er
ita
ge
 
an
d 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e.
 (3
) T
o 
m
ea
su
re
 a
tt
itu
de
s 
to
, a
nd
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n,
 in
 p
ol
iti
ca
l 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
, s
oc
ia
l m
ov
em
en
ts
 a
nd
 c
iv
ic
 a
ct
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 a
m
on
g 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
 in
 E
ur
op
e 
an
d 
to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
ho
w
 t
he
se
 a
tt
itu
de
s 
an
d 
en
ga
ge
m
en
ts
 
ar
e 
di
ff
er
en
tia
te
d 
al
on
g 
lin
es
 o
f 
ge
nd
er
, e
th
ni
ci
ty
, c
la
ss
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
n.
 (4
) T
o 
m
ea
su
re
 v
ie
w
s 
on
 le
gi
tim
at
e 
fo
rm
s 
of
 p
ol
iti
ca
l r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
ac
tio
n 
w
ith
in
 t
he
 c
on
te
xt
 o
f 
di
ff
er
en
t 
de
m
oc
ra
tic
 h
er
ita
ge
s.
 (5
) T
o 
m
ap
 t
he
 r
an
ge
 
of
 y
ou
th
 a
ct
iv
is
m
 a
cr
os
s 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 t
he
 w
ay
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 y
ou
ng
 a
ct
iv
is
ts
 a
re
 
ne
tw
or
ke
d 
in
te
r-
re
gi
on
al
ly
 a
nd
 t
ra
ns
-n
at
io
na
lly
. (
6)
 T
o 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
he
 a
pp
ea
l 
of
 r
ad
ic
al
, e
xt
re
m
e 
or
 p
op
ul
is
t 
m
ov
em
en
ts
 t
o 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
 a
nd
 it
s 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
to
 r
eg
io
na
l, 
na
tio
na
l a
nd
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
po
lit
ic
al
 h
er
ita
ge
. (
7)
 T
o 
in
fo
rm
 a
nd
 a
ss
is
t 
po
lic
y 
an
d 
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
r 
ag
en
ci
es
 t
o 
ch
ar
t 
an
d 
ev
al
ua
te
 t
he
 p
ol
iti
ca
l r
es
po
ns
es
 
to
 p
op
ul
is
m
 in
 t
he
 y
ou
th
 r
el
at
ed
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
of
 p
ol
iti
ca
l p
ar
tie
s 
an
d 
w
ith
in
 y
ou
ng
 
pe
op
le
’s
 o
w
n 
ac
tiv
is
m
.
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cr
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Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 p
ol
iti
ca
l a
nd
 c
iv
ic
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
an
d 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
in
 
ni
ne
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
 T
he
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
fo
cu
se
d 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 o
n 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
by
 
yo
ut
h,
 w
om
en
, m
in
or
iti
es
 a
nd
 m
ig
ra
nt
s,
 f
ou
r 
gr
ou
ps
 t
ha
t 
ha
ve
 t
ra
di
tio
na
lly
 
be
en
 v
ie
w
ed
 a
s 
be
in
g 
at
 r
is
k 
of
 d
is
en
ga
ge
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
ha
d 
a 
di
st
in
ct
 
fo
cu
s 
on
 t
he
 p
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
of
 t
he
 in
di
vi
du
al
 c
iti
ze
n 
an
d 
th
e 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 m
ac
ro
-l
ev
el
 c
on
te
xt
ua
l f
ac
to
rs
 a
nd
 p
ro
xi
m
al
 s
oc
ia
l 
fa
ct
or
s 
ex
er
t 
th
ei
r 
eff
ec
ts
 u
po
n 
ci
tiz
en
s’
 c
iv
ic
 a
nd
 p
ol
iti
ca
l e
ng
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n.
 T
he
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
re
ve
al
ed
 s
ub
st
an
tia
l d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 p
ol
ic
ie
s 
on
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
bo
th
 a
cr
os
s 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
an
d 
w
ith
in
 c
ou
nt
rie
s,
 a
nd
 a
 la
ck
 o
f 
op
en
 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
w
ith
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
na
tio
na
l l
ev
el
 d
es
pi
te
 a
 b
ro
ad
 
al
ig
nm
en
t 
w
ith
 E
U
 p
ol
iti
ca
l p
rio
rit
ie
s.
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 h
ow
 p
eo
pl
e 
ex
pe
rim
en
t 
w
ith
 n
ov
el
 f
or
m
s 
of
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p 
th
at
 m
od
ify
 t
he
 o
ut
lin
es
 o
f 
fo
rm
al
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p.
 T
he
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
pr
og
ra
m
 a
im
ed
 t
o 
ex
am
in
e 
in
 w
ha
t 
w
ay
s 
th
e 
pr
ac
tic
es
 o
f 
ac
to
rs
 w
ho
 fi
nd
 t
he
m
se
lv
es
 in
 s
itu
at
io
ns
 
w
he
re
 t
he
y 
ha
ve
 t
o 
m
ak
e 
do
 w
ith
 t
he
ir 
fa
ul
ts
, h
an
di
ca
ps
, l
ac
k 
of
 r
es
ou
rc
es
, a
re
 
ta
ke
n 
(o
r 
no
r)
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 a
s 
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
 t
o 
ju
rid
ic
al
 c
iti
ze
ns
hi
p.
 Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
su
rv
ey
s 
on
 t
hr
ee
 in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
ed
 fi
el
ds
 (l
an
gu
ag
e 
an
d 
co
de
s,
 p
ro
of
s 
of
 id
en
tit
y,
 
te
st
s 
of
 u
rb
an
ity
) w
er
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
 f
oc
us
 o
n 
“m
ili
eu
s 
of
 t
ra
ns
la
tio
n”
.
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PR
O
FA
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TY
 
– 
Pr
of
an
e 
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ip
 in
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Te
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g 
de
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 h
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Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
so
ug
ht
 t
o 
cl
ar
ify
 w
he
th
er
 d
em
oc
ra
cy
 is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
un
de
r 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
of
 p
lu
ra
lis
m
, d
iv
er
si
ty
 a
nd
 c
om
pl
ex
 m
ul
til
ev
el
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e.
 T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 d
id
 s
o 
by
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
in
g 
th
e 
EU
’s
 p
ro
tr
ac
te
d 
co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
lis
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s,
 t
he
 in
st
itu
tio
na
l 
co
m
pl
ex
 in
 E
ur
op
e,
 t
he
 r
ol
e 
an
d 
st
at
us
 o
f 
ge
nd
er
 w
ith
in
 t
he
 e
nl
ar
ge
d 
Eu
ro
pe
, 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
ci
vi
l s
oc
ie
ty
 a
nd
 t
he
 p
ub
lic
 s
ph
er
e 
fo
r 
le
gi
tim
iz
at
io
n/
de
le
gi
tim
iz
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s,
 t
he
 d
em
oc
ra
tic
 q
ua
lit
y 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
U
ni
on
 w
ith
in
 t
ax
 a
nd
 fi
sc
al
 p
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
w
ith
in
 f
or
ei
gn
 a
nd
 
se
cu
rit
y 
po
lic
y,
 t
he
 e
nl
ar
ge
m
en
t 
pr
oc
es
s 
an
d 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
of
 d
em
oc
ra
cy
 in
 
th
e 
ne
w
 m
em
be
r 
st
at
es
, a
nd
 t
he
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
nd
 p
ro
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
de
m
oc
ra
tiz
at
io
n 
in
 t
ra
ns
na
tio
na
l a
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts
.
Th
e 
RE
-I
nV
es
t 
pr
oj
ec
t 
ai
m
s 
to
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
e 
to
 a
 m
or
e 
so
lid
ar
y 
an
d 
in
cl
us
iv
e 
EU
, t
hr
ou
gh
 a
n 
in
cl
us
iv
e,
 p
ow
er
fu
l a
nd
 e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
so
ci
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
st
ra
te
gy
 
at
 E
U
 le
ve
l. 
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